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This paper reflects on the current state and likely future of the South African social 
assistance system, focusing specifically on its fiscal sustainability, its effectiveness as an 
instrument to combat poverty in a longer-term developmental sense, and its impact on 
the allocation of resources. Despite showing that the grants system is an effective 
intervention which markedly reduces poverty and apparently does not have severe 
undesirable behavioural effects, the paper argues that the scope for strengthening anti-
poverty policy in South Africa by further expanding the social grants system nonetheless 
has become very limited. The main policy conclusions of the paper are that sustainable 
poverty reduction in South Africa requires inclusive job-creating economic growth, and 
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Social assistance reform during 
a period of fiscal stress 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Social  security  systems  provide  protection  against  risks  of  income  loss  due  to 
contingencies such as old age, unemployment, disability, or injuries sustained at work. 
The social assistance components of social security systems consist of non-contributory 
cash or in-kind grants to provide protection to the most needy. During the past two 
decades,  extensive  fiscal  space  and  sweeping  reforms  have  enabled  South  African 
policymakers to develop an unusually large social grants system by the standards of 
middle-income  countries.2  Several  factors,  however,  suggest  that  South  Africa  has 
reached a crossroads in the evolution of the social assistance system: the public finances 
have deteriorated rapidly and severely as a result of a recession linked to the global 
economic  crisis,  large  sections  of  the  population  have  not  experienced  significant 
improvements in their standards  of living since democratisation, and many South 
Africans harbour reservations about aspects of the design and impact of the grants. 
Hence, it is an opportune time to reflect on the current state and likely future of the 
South African social assistance system. 
This paper provides such reflection, focusing specifically on the fiscal sustainability of 
the grants system, its effectiveness as an instrument to combat poverty in a longer-term 
developmental sense, and its impact on the allocation of resources. Section 2  outlines 
the  elements,  growth  and  size  of  the  South  African  social  assistance  system  and 
comments on its budgetary sustainability. Section 3 explores the effectiveness of the 
social assistance system as a mechanism for achieving the Government's objective of a 
developmental approach to poverty alleviation and its efficiency costs in terms of 
distortions to the allocation of resources. To this  end, the section discusses the role of 
the grants system in the broader context of  anti-poverty policy  in South Africa and 
reviews relevant literature on the poverty-mitigating and incentive effects of the grants. 
Against this background, section 4 discuss es the future role of the grants system in 
South  Africa  and  comments  on  two  sets  of  possible  options  for  enhancing  its 
effectiveness. These are conditional cash transfer programmes and workfare schemes to 
expand  the  access  of  unemployed  members  of  the  labo ur  force  to  economic 
opportunities. Section 5 outlines policy implications. 
2  THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
2.1  Elements and coverage 
The social insurance component of the South African social security system consists of 
three contributory funds providing conditional  income  support  or compensation  for 
defined-risk events: the Unemployment Insurance Fund, the Compensation Funds, and 
                                                 
2  South  Africa  had  the  ninth-highest  value  in  a  recent  comparison  of  the  ratios  of  social  assistance 
spending to GDP in 74 developing and transition countries (Weigand and Grosh, 2008: 25-26).   4 
the Road Accident Fund.3 In addition, binding industrial-council and other agreements 
between employers and employee s have introduced an element of compulsion into 
many occupational retirement insurance schemes, thus turning them into quasi -social 
insurance  schemes.4  The  social  assistance  system  provides  means  tested  income 
support for members of three vulnerable groups: children, the elderly and the disabled. 
The remainder of this section outlines these two components of the South African social 
security system in more detail.5 The discussion revolves around coverage in the three 
major life stages of individuals and families: childhood, working age, and old age.6 
2.1.1  Childhood 
The  child  support  grant,  which  was  introduced  in  April  1998  to  replace  the  child 
maintenance grant, currently is the most important form of assistance for children in 
poor families. These grants are paid to the primary caregivers of children.7 Since 1 April 
2010,  the  child  support  grant  amounts  to  R250 per  month,  and  the  number  of 
beneficiaries reached an estimated 9 424 281 on 28 February 2010 (National Treasury, 
2010a: 103, 105). The formula for determining the income threshold for the child 
support grant is A = B * 10, where A is the income threshold and B the monthly value of 
the grant.  Hence, the income threshold now amount s to  R2 500 per month for single 
caregivers and  R5 000 per month for  married  caregivers (R30  000 per  annum  and 
R60 000 per annum, respectively). 
Care dependency grants are paid to the parents or caregivers of children between the 
ages of 1 and 18 years who suffer from severe physical and mental disability and are in 
permanent home care (disabled persons between the ages of 18 and the retirement age 
receive state disability grants, while those above the retirement age receive old-age 
pensions). At the end of February 2010 these grants, the value of which increased to 
R1 080 on 1 April 2010, were paid to an estimated 119 307 care-dependent children 
(National Treasury, 2010a: 103, 105). The means test for care dependency grants is 
similar  to  that  for  child  support  grants:  hence,  in  April  2010  the  income  threshold 
increased  to  R10 800  per  month  for  single  caregivers  and  R21 600  per  month  for 
married caregivers (R129 600 per annum and R259 200 per annum, respectively). 
Foster care grants are disbursed to children deemed in need of care by the courts. Such 
children  are  placed  in  the  custody  of  foster  parents  designated  by  the  courts  and 
                                                 
3  Social  insurance  programmes  consist  of  benefits  organised  by  the  state  and  funded  by  means  of 
specified contributions by employers and employees. 
4 In South Africa, unlike in many other countries, contributions paid by employers and employees are not 
included in social security taxes, because they do not flow through the coffers of  the state. International 
comparisons of the extent of social security provision  based on government spending ratios therefore 
misrepresent the scope of insurance provision in South Africa. 
5 This paper does not discuss the informal insurance component of social security  systems (cash or in-
kind assistance from the extended family and   other social networks), which by nature is difficult to 
influence by means of policy interventions. 
6 Two elements are omitted  from the discussion: compensation paid to victims of road accidents by the 
Road Accident Fund, and temporary grant-in-aid relief payments. 
7 Child support grants initially benefitted children under the age of seven years, but the coverage of the 
programme was expanded gradually and the grant is being rolled out poor children up to the age of 18 
over the next three years (National Treasury, 2010a: 104).   5 
supervised by social workers. The aim of the grant is to reimburse foster parents for the 
cost of caring for children who are not their own; as such, the grant is not means tested 
and falls away if the child is adopted formally. From 1 April 2010 foster care grants 
amount  to  R710 per  month  and  the  number  of  beneficiaries  reached  an  estimated 
569 215 at the end of February 2010 (National Treasury, 2010a: 103, 105). 
2.1.2  Working age 
The Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) provides short-term compensation for qualify-
ing workers.8 Employees and employers each contribute 1  percent of the employee’s 
monthly earnings up to a threshold of R12 478 to the UIF, and the proceeds are used to 
pay benefits to contributors or their dependents in instances of unemployment, illness, 
death,  maternity  and  adoption  of  a  child.  Income  replacement  rates  range  from 
60 percent  for  low-income  earners  to  38 percent  for  higher-income  earners,  and 
benefits are limited to one day for every six completed working days, up to a maximum 
of 238 days (34 weeks) in a period of four years. On average, the UIF disbursed about 
R495.8 million  per  month  to  207 967  beneficiaries  during  the  first  nine  months  of 
2009/10 (National Treasury, 2010a: 107). On 31 March 2009, the Fund's capital and 
reserves amounted to R34.6 billion, and an actuarial valuation at the time indicated that 
it would be able to meet its cash-flow requirements over the next ten years for a wide 
range of possible claims scenarios (National Treasury, 2010a: 107). 
The Compensation Funds provide income benefits and medical care to workers injured 
on the job, funding for the rehabilitation of disabled workers, and survivor benefits to 
the  families  of  victims  of  work-related  fatalities.  The  main  Compensation  Fund  is 
administered by the Department of Labour and covers workers in sectors other than 
mining and construction, while the Department of Health administers the Mines and 
Works Compensation Fund, which provides benefits to victims of lung diseases caused 
by  working  conditions.  Private  firms  licensed  by  the  Compensation  Commissioner 
administer two other funds: the Rand Mutual Association for workers in the mining 
industry and the Federated Employers' Mutual Assurance for workers in the building 
industry. On 31 March 2009, the main Compensation Fund held an accumulated surplus 
of R6.5 billion and a reserves of R13.9 billion (National Treasury, 2010a: 109). 
State disability grants are available to people disabled in circumstances other than road 
and work-related accidents. The grant is paid to disabled persons between the ages of 
18 and the retirement age who do not receive other state grants and who are not cared 
for in state institutions. Eligibility is determined by strict medical-based criteria: the 
disability should be permanent and sufficiently severe to prevent the affected person 
from entering the  labour market. Hence, the purpose  of the  grant  is to  compensate 
disabled  persons  for  loss  of  income.  Disability  grants  have  amounted  to  R1 080 per 
month  since  1  April  2010,  and  the  number  of  beneficiaries  was  expected  to  reach 
1 310 761  by  the  end  of  February  2010  (National  Treasury,  2010a:  103,  105).  The 
means test formula for the disability grant is D = 1.3A – 0.5B, where D is the monthly 
disability grant, A the maximum monthly disability grant, and B the monthly private 
                                                 
8 The Unemployment Insurance Act and the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act do not apply to 
the following categories of workers: those working  fewer than 24 hours  per month for an employer, 
learners, public servants, contracted  foreign workers, workers whose earnings consist of commission 
only, and working earning a monthly old-age social pension.   6 
income  of the  beneficiary. The threshold monthly private incomes  for eligibility are 
R2 426 for single and R4 852 for married adults (R29 112 per annum and R58 224 per 
annum, respectively). An additional provision states that grants are not paid to single 
and married disabled adults whose assets exceed R484 800 or R969 600, respectively. 
2.1.3  Old age 
South  Africa  has  a  well-established  retirement  fund  market.  The  coverage  rate  for 
formal-sector  employees  of  about  60 percent  is  comparatively  high  by  international 
standards, which indicates the extent to which membership of an occupational fund is 
accepted  as  an  obligatory  condition  of  employment  (National  Treasury,  2007a:  5). 
According to  the  National Treasury (2007a:  5),  South Africa's ratio of pension  fund 
assets  to  GDP  of  63 percent  compare  favourably  with  those  of  countries  such  as 
Australia, Chile, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. 
Coverage rates, however, vary considerably across income categories. Partly because of 
the  favourable  tax  treatment  of  retirement  saving,  most  middle-  and  high-income 
earners  are  well  covered:  almost  all  formal-sector  employees  who  earn  more  than 
R120 000  per  annum  belong  to  a  pension,  provident  or  retirement  fund  (National 
Treasury, 2008b: 100-101). Coverage is much less comprehensive among lower-income 
earners, however: some 360 000 formal employees in the R60 000 to R120 000 income 
category  and  fully  2.7 million  of  those  earning  less  than  R60 000  per  annum  lack 
retirement  coverage.  In  total,  only  an  estimated  5.9 million  of  the  8 million  formal-
sector workers (i.e. roughly one-half of the about 12.3 million employed and one-third 
of  the  16.8 million  economically  active  South  Africans)  have  retirement  coverage 
(National Treasury, 2008b: 100). Moreover, early withdrawals and limited access to 
cost-effective instruments render the income replacement rates for many pension and 
provident fund members inadequate. Fewer than half of those who reach retirement 
age  with  a  funded  pension  receive  more  than  28 percent  of  their  pre-retirement 
incomes (National Treasury, 2007a: 5), and the Smith Committee (1995: 18) found that 
40 percent of occupational pensions paid had a lower value than the social pension. 
Hence, lower-income South Africans (including many formal-sector workers) depend on 
social pensions in old age. Means-tested pensions are payable to persons of retirement 
age and older; since 2008, the retirement age for men is being lowered from 65 to 60 
years to bring it in line with that of women in 2010. The maximum amount of the grant 
has been R1 080 per month since 1 April 2010 and an estimated 2 534 082 individuals 
received social pensions at the end of February 2010. The means test formula for the 
social old-age pension is the same as that of the disability grant: D = 1.3A – 0.5B, where 
D is the monthly pension payable, A the maximum monthly pension payable, and B the 
monthly  private  income  of  the  recipient.  Single  and  married  elderly  persons  whose 
assets  exceed  R484 800  or  R969 600,  respectively,  are  not  eligible  to  receive  social 
pensions. At the end of February 2010, some 1 248 war veterans received grants subject 
to the same income and asset thresholds applicable to social pensions. The value of 
these grants increased to R1 100 per month on 1 April 2010. 
2.2  Growth and size 
Government  spending  on  social  grants  payments  increased  from  R16 027 million 
(2.3 percent of GDP) in fiscal year 1998 to R71 161 million (3.1 percent of GDP) in fiscal   7 
year 2009. Data on social security spending indicates that this expansion was part of a 
longer-term growth trend: outlays  on social  protection (which include social grants, 
disbursements  by  the  social  security  funds  and  pension  payments  to  former 
government employees) increased from 6.2 percent of general government spending in 
fiscal  year  1983  to  14.0 percent  in  fiscal  year  2007;  that  is,  from  1.8 percent  to 
4.5 percent of GDP (cf. Figure 1).9 This outcome resulted from various developments 
that have affected beneficiary numbers and the values of the various grants, including 
the equalisation of benefits across population and gender groups, adjustments  of grant 
amounts to fully or partially counteract the effects of inflation, the introduction and 




The number of beneficiaries of social grants increased from 2 889 442 in April 1997 to 
13 114 033 in  April  2009 (cf. Table  1).  More than one quarter of the South African 
population now receive a state grant – a remarkably high figure for a middle-income 
country.  Although  all  the  grant  types  except  the  war  veterans'  grant  experienced 
significant growth in beneficiary numbers during the past decade, the major driver of 
such growth in the system as a whole clearly has been the introduction and subsequent 
expansion of the coverage of the child support grant. Fully 67.3 percent of all grants 
paid  in  April  2009  were  child  support  grants;  other  large  categories  were  old-age 
pensions (18.4 percent) and disability grants (9.8 percent). Because it is the smallest of 
the grants in rand terms, however, the child support grant does not dominate social 
assistance outlays. Thus, the 2010/11 Budget provided for social assistance expenditure 
of  R89 368 million,  of  which  R34 058 million  (38.1 percent)  was  allocated  for  social 
pensions,  R30 860 million  (34.5 percent)  for  child  support  grants,  R17 379 million 
                                                 
9 The sharp spike in both ratios in 1993/94 resulted from a special transfer amounting to R7 340 million 
to improve the actuarial position of the Government Employees Pension Fund. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank electronic data



















































P  8 
(19.4 percent) for disability grants  and R7 071 million  (7.9 percent) for other grants 
(National Treasury, 2010a: 106). 
  Table 1   
  Beneficiaries of social assistance grants (1997-2009)   
  Grant         Number of beneficiaries (30 April)1       
  1997  2003  2009   
  Old age grant  1 737 682  2 022 206  2 414 183   
  War veterans' grant  12 047  4 594  1 649   
  Disability grant  732 322  953 965  1 281 556   
  Foster care grant  41 865  138 763  483 687   
  Care dependency grant  2 895  58 140  107 134   
  Child support grant2  362 631  2 630 826  8 825 824   
  Total  2 889 442  5 808 494  13 114 033   
  Sources:  National Treasury (2001; 2007b); South African Social Security Agency (2009)   
  Notes:  1  The numbers exclude the recipients of grant in aid and social relief of distress.   
    2  The 1997 number represents parent allowance and child allowance grants.   
         
Figure 2 indicates that the nominal values of all the grants rose markedly between 1994 
and 2009. These increases, however, often did not keep pace with inflation, especially 
during the second half of the 1990s.  Accordingly, the purchasing power of the old-age 
pension, war veterans' pension, disability grant, care dependency grant and foster care 
grant all increased only modestly between 1994 and 2009. By contrast, the purchasing 
power  of  the  child  support  grant  has  increased  markedly  in  real  terms  since  its 
introduction in 1998. 
2.3  The budgetary sustainability of the social assistance system 
The rapid growth and size of the South African social grants system have given rise to 
concern about it longer-term sustainability, within as well as outside of government. In 
2004, for example, the National Treasury (2004a: 73) commented as follows on trends 
in the ratio between social grants expenditure and GDP: "This ratio is high compared to 
most  other  developing  countries,  and  also  high  relative  to  spending  on  cash  social 
assistance in some high income countries. Growth of this magnitude relative to GDP 
raises  sustainability  questions  for  the  future."  In  addition,  the  limited  size  of  South 
Africa's tax base also has contributed to concern about the sustainability of the social 
assistance  system.  In  this  regard,  critics  sometimes  point  to  the  gap  between  the 
numbers  of  individual  taxpayers  and  beneficiaries  of  social  grants:  at  the  end  of 
February  2009,  for  example,  South  Africa  had  some  2.3  grant  recipients  for  every 
registered individual taxpayer.10 
                                                 
10 On 28 February 2009, South Africa had 5 540 646 registered individual taxpayers and 12 972 828 grant 
recipients (National Treasury, 2009b: 6; South African Social Security Agency, 2009: 5).   9 
Figure 2 
 
Figure  3  shows  that  the  fiscal  situation  has  remained  sustainable  despite  the  rapid 
growth in government spending on grants and other social security programmes from 
the mid-1980s onwards.11  
                                                 
11 A fiscal position is sustainable when the public debt burden does not pose the risk of an unmanageable 
upward deficit-debt spiral leading to debt default, given public spending commitments and tax capacity 
and compliance. An analysis of fiscal policy in South Africa between 1960 and 2008 by Calitz, Du Plessis 
and  Siebrits  (2009)  showed  that  the  post-1985  period  formed  part  of  a  longer-term  epoch  of  fiscal 
prudence during which South Africa avoided the fiscal policy-rooted macroeconomic crises that plagued 
many developing countries in Africa and elsewhere during this period. 
Sources : National Treasury (various issues); South African Reserve Bank electronic data
Current prices Constant 2008 prices
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Figure 3 
 
The thorough overhaul of tax administration and collection in the second half of the 
1990s and sustained positive economic growth from 1994 until 2008 were the main 
reasons why growing social assistance spending has not caused fiscal problems: the 
Revenue and expenditure
Budget balance (surplus +, deficit -)
Net loan debt
Source: South African Reserve Bank electronic data
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consequent  rapid  growth  in  tax  revenues  has  enabled  the  Government  to  steadily 
expand  social  grants  spending  while  reducing  budget  deficits  and  the  public  debt 
burden during the second half of the 1990s and keeping these aggregates at manageable 
levels thereafter.12 Table 2 highlights how extensive the fiscal space available to the 
authorities was after the successful conclusion of the fiscal consolidation effort in 2000: 
from 2001 until 2007, the combination of rapid revenue growth and steady decreases in 
the interest payments on public debt made it possible to increase the GDP shares o f 
almost all functional spending categories in the context of an expansionary fiscal policy 
stance which raised general government expenditure from 30.3 percent to 32.1 percent 
of GDP. Hence, in contrast to the period from 1995 to 2000 (when general govern ment 
outlays decreased by 4.1 percentage points of GDP),  the expansion of social security 
spending  from  2001  until  2007  did  not  require  compensating  reductions  (as 
percentages of GDP) in expenditures on other general government functions. 
Table 2 
Functional classification of general government spending (1995, 2001 and 2007) 
      Percentages of GDP   
1995  2001  2007 
General public services  4.2  3.1  5.5 
Protection services  5.3  4.5  4.8 
Social services  15.0  14.8  15.6 
  Education  7.0  6.2  5.8 
Health  3.1  3.1  3.2 
Social protection  3.2  3.5  4.5 
Other social services  1.7  1.9  2.2 
Economic services  5.2  3.1  3.2 
Public debt transactions  4.7  4.9  2.8 
Total  34.4  30.3  32.1 
Source: South African Reserve Bank electronic data 
 
Table 3 shows that the recent global financial crisis has dramatically changed the fiscal 
situation in South Africa. The sharp slowdown in economic activity reduced national 
government tax revenue from 26.9 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2008 to an estimated 
23.3 percent  in  fiscal  year  2010;  over  the  same  period,  expenditures  (boosted  by 
countercyclical  outlays  and  the  capitalisation  of  Eskom,  inter  alia)  increased  from 
26.0 percent of GDP to an estimated 30.6 percent. These developments resulted in a 
sharp  deterioration  of  the  national  government's  budget  balance  from  a  surplus  of 
0.9 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2008 to a projected deficit of 7.3 percent in fiscal year 
                                                 
12 Growing spending on social grants contributed to relatively large budget deficits from 1990 onwards, 
but  was  a  markedly  less  important  causal  factor  than  several  extraordinary  expenditures  (including 
drought relief spending and transfer payments to the government pension fund to improve its actuarial 
position) and the depressing effect on tax revenues of the protracted recession that lasted  from 1989 
until 1993 (see Calitz et al., 2009: 5-6).   12 
2010. National government gross loan debt is projected to reach 43.1 percent of GDP in 
fiscal year 2013, up from 27.0 percent in 2009 (National Treasury, 2010a: 61). 
Table 3 
National government fiscal framework (2008-2013) 
  Percentages of GDP at the end of fiscal years 
  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
  Outcomes  Estimates 
Revenue  26.9  26.2  23.3  23.8  24.3  24.5 
Expenditure  26.0  27.4  30.6  30.3  29.9  29.3 
  Debt-service costs  2.5  2.3  2.4  2.6  3.0  3.2 
Budget balance  0.9  -1.2  -7.3  -6.5  -5.6  -4.8 
Gross loan debt  27.7  27.0  32.5  37.1  40.9  43.1 
Source: National Treasury (2010a: 61, 93) 
Prudent management of the public finances before and during the crisis has left South 
Africa in a much sounder fiscal position than many other countries, including several 
member states of the European Union.13 Long-term modelling by the National Treasury 
(2010a: 63) based on an average GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent per annum indicated 
that the public debt should peak at a modest level of 44 percent of GDP in 2015/16 and 
decrease thereafter, albeit gradually. Hence, the available information does not suggest 
that the government spending-to-GDP ratio is likely to increase to such an extent over 
the  next  decade  that  severe  cutbacks  in  social  assistance  would  be  required.  More 
generally,  revenue  growth  obviously  will  be  a  key  factor  determining  the  scope  for 
expanding the social assistance system in the longer run. As was indicated earlier, the 
rapid growth in expenditure on social grants during the late-1990s and early 2000s was 
facilitated by exceptionally high rates of growth in tax revenues related to institutional 
reforms  which  improved  tax  administration  and  collection.  Such  rates  of  revenue 
growth are unlikely to recur once the economy has recovered fully from the effects of 
the global crisis, and this may well severely constrain future growth in public spending 
(including outlays on social grants). 
In the short to medium term, fiscal consolidation has become unavoidable. Apart from 
adding  large  and  potentially  unsustainable  amounts  to  the  public  debt,  deficits  of 
7 percent of GDP or more will put upward pressure on interest rates and discourage 
private  investment  (especially  in  the  context  of  the  large  infrastructure  investment 
programmes to be undertaken by various public corporations in the next few years14); 
furthermore, the increases in interest payments resulting from a rapi dly growing debt 
burden could crowd out public spending on priority functions. The 2010/2011 Budget   
                                                 
13 The worst-hit country has been Greece, where the budget deficit has reached 12.7 percent of GDP and 
the public-debt-to-GDP ratio more than 110 percent (Why Pigs' mess is our concern, 1 March 2010). 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain have also recorded large fiscal deficits and public debt burdens well in excess 
of the 60 percent of GDP limit prescribed by the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact. 
14 The public sector is expected to spend a total of R846 billion on infrastructure projects during the fiscal 
years 2011, 2012 and 2013 (National Treasury, 2010a: 66).   13 
which provides for a phased reduction in the budget deficit of the national government 
to 4.8 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2013 based on a combination of revenue growth and 
strict expenditure discipline   represents the first step of such a consolidation effort. 
The Budget provides for a 1 percentage point reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2013 despite an expected increase in the debt costs 
component of 0.6 percentage points of GDP (cf. Table 3). This reduction will be based in 
part  on  identified  cost  savings  of  R25.6 billion  at  national-government  level  and 
R13.4 billion at the provincial level (National Treasury, 2010a: 117).15 The adjustment 
imperative clearly will leave no room for the introduction of costly new social assistance 
initiatives  between 2011 and 2013 ,  but the Government remains committed to the 
extension of the child support grant to eligible children up to their 18 th birthday during 
this period.  
3  SOCIAL GRANTS, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This section discusses the effectiveness and incentive effects of the South African social 
assistance system. Section 3.1 outlines the current role of social grants in anti-poverty 
policy in South Africa. Section 3.2 comments on two aspects of the effectiveness of the 
social assistance system. First, it shows the extent to which the grants mitigate poverty 
by augmenting the incomes of poor South Africans. Second, it summarises evidence on 
the utilisation of social grants by the poor. In this regard, the key issue is whether the 
grants merely serve as a short-term palliative to poverty or play a developmental role as 
well (that is, enable poor people to break the cycle of poverty by undertaking income-
generating activities and accumulating assets). Section 3.3 explores the impact of the 
grants system on allocative efficiency by identifying its most important incentive effects 
and empirical evidence on behavioural responses to such incentives. 
3.1  Social grants as a component of anti-poverty policy in South Africa 
The post-apartheid South African Government has consistently stressed the importance 
of job-creating economic growth as a mechanism for reducing poverty, arguing that 
growth creates economic opportunities which enable poor households to earn better 
incomes  through  jobs  or  self-employment.16  Accordingly, the period since 1994 has 
seen the genesis of two strategies to accelerate economic growth, namely Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (Gear – 1996) and the Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative South Africa (Asgisa – 2005). Mindful of the high incidence of unemployment 
and deprivation in South Africa, however, the Government has also used a wide range of 
interventions to enhance the poverty-mitigating impact of economic growth (cf. Altman 
and Hemson, 2007: 8; The Presidency, 2008: 13-14): 
                                                 
15  The  expenditure  implications  of  this  deficit-reduction  strategy  pose  particular  challenges  to  the 
provinces, whose current spending increased rapidly in 2008 and 2009 as a result of employment growth, 
significant general salary increases and the implementation of occupation-specific salary dispensations 
(mainly in education and health). 
16 As the National Treasury (2010a: 2, 5) put it: "Our future depends on finding a more inclusive economic 
trajectory,  characterized by more rapid growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and job creation... 
Increasing employment is the only sustainable solution to reducing poverty and inequality".   14 
  The  Expanded  Public  Works  Programme  (EPWP)  aims  to  relieve  poverty  by 
creating  short-term  jobs,  provide  experience  and  training  to  previously 
unemployed persons, and provide access to further employment. 
  As  was  indicated  in  section  2,  the  social  insurance  and  social  assistance 
components  of  the  social  security  system  provide  protection  against  risks  of 
income loss due to various contingencies. 
  Human  capital  investments  in  health  care,  education  and  training  enhance 
productivity and facilitate participation in the economy. 
  A  "social  wage"  consisting  of  basic  services  and  other  non-financial  transfers 
provides subsidised housing and access to water, electricity, refuse removal and 
sanitation, including a raft of minimum free basic services for vulnerable groups 
to prevent non-access to such services because of inability to pay. 
  Programmes that facilitate access to assets (especially housing, land and capital) 
aim  to  improve  the  economic  and  social  security  of  poor  households  and  to 
provide them with bases for longer-term involvement in the economy. 
The social assistance system plays a very specific role within this gamut of anti-poverty 
interventions, namely to provide assistance to needy groups who are not economically 
active (the disabled and poor children and elderly individuals). The draft discussion 
document  on  an  anti-poverty  strategy  for  South  Africa  released  in  October  2008 
confirmed the importance of this role:17 
As a country we have done relatively w ell in terms of providing social 
assistance, which research evidence shows plays a significant role in 
alleviating poverty. The provision of social grants will need to continue, 
particularly for the vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, the 
aged and children. (The Presidency, 2008: 16) 
The document nonetheless reiterated that the promotion of opportunities remained the 
primary focus of anti-poverty policy: 
As we go forward, we need to strengthen our resolve to  reduce  the 
incidence of poverty as well as to prevent intergenerational transmission 
of poverty within households and communities… Key to this resolve is 
creating  and  increasing  economic  opportunities  and  facilitating 
access to these. Unemployment and/or the absence of earned income are 
the major causes of poverty. Our efforts should be focused on ensuring 
that as a country we create economic opportunities that will ensure the 
promotion of self-sufficiency. (The Presidency, 2008: 16, emphasis in the 
original) 
Several  recent  policy  developments  have  confirmed  the  Government's  focus  on  the 
promotion of opportunities as a strategy for reducing poverty. Most notable was the 
announcement of two important interventions aimed at job creation, namely Phase II of 
the Expanded Public Works Programme and a youth-targeted wage subsidy scheme (cf. 
section  4.3).  At  the  same  time,  the  Government's  resolve  to  continue  to  restrict 
                                                 
17 As yet, the initial discussion document has not been followed by further drafts or a final document.   15 
assistance  to  economically  inactive  persons  has  been  confirmed  by  the  refusal  to 
introduce a universal income grant despite pressure by sections of civil society and 
endorsement of such a grant in 2002 by the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive 
Social Security System (the Taylor Committee).18 
Government interventions to combat poverty include outlays  on goods and services 
(e.g. expenditures on the provision of education, health care, social grants, housing and 
municipal  services  such  as  water  and  electricity)  and  regulatory  measures  (e.g.  the 
Broad-Based  Black  Economic  Empowerment  and  employment  equity  initiatives  and 
labour legislation). Ideally, assessment of the role of the social grants system should be 
undertaken against the backdrop of the effects of all such interventions. Quantification 
of the impact of regulatory measures is notoriously difficult, however, and will not be 
attempted in this paper. Instead, this section draws on the findings of a study of the 
incidence of social spending undertaken for the National Treasury (Van der Berg, 2009) 
to comment on aspects of the poverty-reducing role of social grants in South Africa. The 
study investigated the incidence of the following social spending categories: school and 
tertiary education, social grants, hospitals, health clinics, and subsidised housing. The 
analysis covered 68 percent of consolidated general government expenditure on social 
services, with the coverage of the individual spending categories as follows: education   
84 percent, health services   70 percent, social security   68 percent, and housing   
64 percent. Measured in current-price terms, expenditure on these items amounted to 
R177 billion in 2006; this constituted 37.5 percent of total consolidated non-interest 
government spending and more than 10 percent of GDP.  
As  was  indicated  in  section  2.3,  social  spending  has  grown  markedly  since  1994. 
Expressed in constant 2000 Rand values, expenditures on the items  included in the 
study nearly doubled from R67.7 billion in 1995 to R133.6 billion in 2006. Growth in 
social spending was particularly rapid from 2000 to 2006, buoyed by robust economic 
and government revenue growth. During this period, the aggregate growth rates of the 
individual  social  spending  categories  ranged  from  127 percent  (social  grants)  to 
15 percent (tertiary education). Outlays on social grants increased from 20 percent of 
the  social  spending  items  included  in  the  study  in  2000  to  30 percent  in  2006  and 
overtook spending on public hospitals as the second largest programme after school 
education. Growth in social spending outstripped population growth to such an extent 
that real per capita social spending increased by 21 percent from R1 643 in 1995 to 
R1 987 in 2000 and by a further 42 percent to R2 822 in 2006. 
                                                 
18 The campaign for the adoption of a universal income grant system has revolved around calls for a basic 
income grant (BIG) of R100 per month to all South Africans, irrespective of age and economic status. (The 
equivalent of a monthly grant of R100 in 2002 in 2009 would have been one of R307.) The Government 
has  never  responded  in  detail  to the  arguments  of the  Taylor  Committee  and  other  proponents  of a 
universal income grant, but remarks by ministers and officials and press statements indicated that its 
opposition to the introduction of a BIG system resulted from concern about the affordability of such an 
intervention and the danger of creating an unhealthy dependency on welfare payments among the poor 
(cf.  Coleman,  2003).  Coleman  (2003:  22,  23)  suggested  that  fears  within  Government  regarding  the 
affordability of a BIG system may well have been grounded in broader and longer-term considerations: 
"… one gets the impression that the real concern is less about whether the fiscus would be able to afford 
it; and more about the implications of giving in to what is seen as 'populist demands'. First, that it would 
open up the government (or future governments) to pressure to increase the amount of the grant, and 
that costs could spiral out of control… Second, there seems to be a fear that agreeing to a BIG would open 
the floodgates for other major new areas of expenditure."   16 
Apart from growth in amounts expended, the poverty impact of social spending was 
enhanced further by improved targeting. This is confirmed by changes in concentration 
ratios.  Related  to  Gini  coefficients,  concentration  ratios  are  measures  that  assume 
positive  values  when  spending  programmes  favour  the  rich,  zero  when  spending  is 
completely evenly distributed and negative values when spending programmes favour 
the poor. The concentration ratio for all social spending items included in the study 
improved  from  –0.112  in  2000  to  –0.152  in  2006  (cf.  Table  4)    a  considerable 
improvement to a level that indicates extremely good targeting of the poor.19 Over the 
same period, the portion of such social spending benefitting the poorest 40  percent of 
the population increased from 47.1 percent to 50.1 percent. Concentration ratios as well 
as the benefit shares of the poorest 40 percent indicated that social grants were the best 
targeted  of  all  social  spending  programmes. 20  These  numbers  testif ied  to  the 
effectiveness of the means tests used to determine eligibility for social grants as tools to 
prevent errors of inclusion (i.e. leakage of social assistance funds to the non-poor).21 
Table 4 
Indicators of the targeting of social spending in South Africa (2000 and 2006) 
  Spending category  Concentration ratios  Benefit shares poorest 40%   
  2000  2006  2000  2006   
  School education  -0.121  -0.128  48.7  49.1   
  Tertiary education  0.528  0.641  7.2  3.7   
  Social grants  -0.371  -0.359  —  —   
    Child support grants  -0.247  -0.318  57.3  61.7   
    Disability grants  -0.291  -0.288  60.0  58.5   
    Old-age pensions  -0.412  -0.436  69.9  70.2   
  Health  -0.118  -0.137  —  —   
    Public clinics  -0.177  -0.257  50.0  57.3   
    Public hospitals  -0.105  -0.103  43.2  44.6   
  Housing  0.160  0.070  21.3  23.9   
  All social spending  -0.112  -0.152  47.1  50.1   
  Source: Van der Berg (2009: 14, 27)   
     
The study also showed that social spending had a significant and growing redistributive 
impact in South Africa. The last columns in Figure 4 confirm two trends highlighted 
earlier, namely that social spending increased substantially in real per capita  terms 
                                                 
19 Some of the concentration ratios for 2006 (e.g. those for school education, public hospitals and public 
clinics) are particularly impressive compared to those for more than 30 developing countries reported by 
Yaqub (1999). A notable exception is the ratio for tertiary education. See Van der Berg (2009: 13). 
20 For a discussion of the factors influencing the targeting of the various social spending programmes, see 
Van der Berg (2009: 14-17). 
21 These benefits of means testing came at the expense of higher administrative costs, the risk of errors of 
exclusion, and possible perverse incentive effects. For an assessment of tar geting and means testing in 
South Africa, see Samson, MacQuene, Van Niekerk, Kaniki, Kallmann and Williams (2007).   17 
between 1995 and 2006 and that the largest part of this increase occurred after 2000. 
Furthermore, the figure shows that gains in social benefits were recorded right across 
the income distribution, but the gains for the poor were particularly large. An important 
reason  for  this  was  the  rapid  growth  of  the  particularly  well-targeted  social  grants 
spending. In real terms, per capita social spending for the poorest 40 percent of the 
population increased more than two-and-a-half fold over eleven years, from R1 373 in 
1995 to R2 329 in 2000 and R3 532 in 2006 (all in 2000 Rand values). This reflected 
both the aggregate growth of social spending and improved targeting. The increase of 
more than R1 200 per person for the poorest 40 percent of the population since 2000 
was almost three times as large as for the richest 20 percent. 
Figure 4 
 
Table 5 provides rough estimates of the extent of redistribution through fiscal processes 
in 1995, 2000 and 2006. For each year, the table shows Gini coefficients for pre-fiscal 
incomes or expenditures (excluding grants), incomes including social spending benefits, 
and incomes including social spending benefits minus taxes paid. The comparability of 
the  three  underlying  income  distributions  is  subject  to  some  uncertainty,  and  the 
important numbers therefore are the impact of fiscal processes on the Gini coefficients 
in specific years and how this has evolved over time.22 In 2006, the Gini coefficient for 
pre-transfer income was 0.69, but it dropped to 0.52 for income plus benefits  and to 
0.47 after taxes had also been subtracted. Furthermore, the comparison with earlier 
years suggest that the budget has become more redistributive over time, with the 
mitigating impact of fiscal processes on the Gini coefficient increasing from 0.138  in 
                                                 
22 The Gini coefficient is a well-known summary indicator of the distribution of income ranging from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). It should be noted also that the coefficients in table 5 are not 
conventional  Gini  coefficients  for  all  income;  as  such,  they  are  not  comparable  to  published  Gini 
coefficients for other countries. 
Real per capita social spending benefits by income quintiles
(2000 Rand values; 1995, 2000 and 2006)
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1995 to 0.180 in 2000 and 0.223 in 2006. Three conclusions regarding the impact of the 
budget on the distribution of income follow: 
  The South African fiscal process was highly redistributive. 
  Social spending had an especially large mitigating impact on income inequality, 
reducing  the  estimated  Gini  coefficients  significantly  more  than  what  the 
progressive income tax system did. 
  Income  inequality  remained  extremely  large  even  after  the  effects  of  all 
redistributive  taxes  and  social  spending  programmes  had  been  taken  into 
consideration. This emphasised the limits of fiscal redistribution and the need 
for  a  reduction  of  market-generated  income  inequality.  The  latter  requires  a 
combination of human capital enhancement and economic growth. 
Table 5 
Estimates of fiscal redistribution in South Africa (1995, 2000 and 2006) 
    Gini coefficients   
  1995  2000  2006   
  A Income/expenditure (excluding grants)  0.666  0.707  0.690   
  B Income plus benefits  0.578  0.576  0.523   
  C Income plus benefits less taxes  0.528  0.527  0.467   
  Effects of the fiscal process (A – C)  -0.138  -0.180  -0.223   
  Source: Van der Berg (2009: 24)   
     
This study also set out to investigate the  redistributive impact of the provision of free 
basic municipal services (water and electricity). In the provision of such services, the 
mechanism for assisting the poor is cross-subsidisation within municipal boundaries. 
Unfortunately,  this  part  of  the  study  could  not  be  completed  successfully  because 
suitably disaggregated data for determining the impact  of free basic services on the 
positions of the poor and the non-poor were not available.23 
The findings of the fiscal incidence study highlighted important aspects of the role of the 
social assistance system in anti-poverty policy in South Africa. The social grants system 
clearly is a component of a wide-ranging suite of public expenditure programmes aimed 
at redistributing income and fighting poverty. Benefit incidence analysis suggests that 
these programmes generally are quite effective at transferring reso urces to the poor. 
The social grants system is a salient element of this suite of interventions for at least 
three reasons. The first is its size: as was indicated earlier, outlays on social grants now 
form more than one-third of government social spending, making it the second largest 
component of such spending after education. Second, social grants programmes are 
particularly effective instruments for ensuring that resources reach the poor, being the 
best targeted of all social spending categories. Third, the social assistance system is the 
main  cash-transfer  component  of  poverty -focused  public  spending  programmes  in 
South  Africa.  By  providing  cash  to  individuals  who  are  incapable  of  earning  an 
                                                 
23 For a discussion of the deficiencies of existing data sources, see Essop and Moses (2009).   19 
independent living (e.g. the disabled and poor children and elderly persons), the social 
grants schemes complement anti-poverty interventions which build human capital (e.g. 
provision of education and health services) and meet other basic needs (e.g. housing, 
water and electricity subsidies). 
3.2  The effectiveness of the South African social assistance system 
This section presents evidence on three questions relating to the effectiveness of the 
South African  social  grants  system. First, what is the  impact of social grants  on the 
incomes  of  poor  households  (section  3.2.1)?  Second,  for  what  purposes  do  poor 
households use social grant income (section 3.2.2)? Third, does the social grants system 
give rise to widespread unintended effects of an undesirable nature (section 3.2.3)? 
3.2.1  Social grants and the incomes of poor households 
Social grants have become an increasingly common and important source of income for 
poor South Africans during the past ten to fifteen years. Table 6 highlights that the 
proportions of households in the poorest four quintiles who reported receiving income 
from grants increased markedly between 1997 and 2006; in the period from 2002 until 
2006, similar increases were evident in the proportions of households in the poorest 
two quintiles who indicated that grants were their major source of income. 
  Table 6   
  Percentages of households reporting income from grants   
 
Quintile 
Any income  Main source of income   
1997  2002  2006  2002  2006 
1  15.9  32.0  69.4  16.1  47.7 
2  54.0  55.8  69.9  31.4  51.0 
3  46.7  51.6  69.4  31.1  34.5 
4  33.8  33.2  45.4  18.1  16.0 
5  14.0  11.3  12.0  4.4  2.5 
All  32.9  36.8  55.2  18.2  30.4 
  Source: Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent (2010: 61)   
     
Figure 5 shows that poor households generally lack access to adequate wage income 
and  therefore  depend  heavily  on  grant  income.24  In 2008, labour-market earnings 
constituted more than 80  percent of the total incomes   of each of the three richest 
deciles, but only 18.7 percent of the total income of the poorest decile. Grant income 
was an insignificant source of income for the rich  – the income shares of grants for 
deciles 8, 9 and 10 amounted to 6.8 percent, 2.6 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively – 
but  dominated  the  cash  incomes  of  the  poor.  Thus,  in  the  four  poorest  deciles,  the 
income  shares  of  social  grants  ranged  from  48.3 percent  (decile  4)  to  72.7 percent 
                                                 
24 The figure is based on 2008 data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), as reported by 
Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent (2010).   20 
(decile  1).  Van  der  Berg  (2009:  27,  29)  estimated  that  the  three  largest  grant 
programmes  (the  old-age  pension,  the  child  support  grant  and  the  disability  grant) 
more  than  doubled  the  income  share  of  the  two  poorest  quintiles  in  2006  from 
3.3 percent of total pre-transfer income to 7.6 percent of income including grants. 
Figure 5 
 
To obtain a rough indication of the mitigating effect of social grants on poverty, some 
studies  (e.g.  Woolard,  2003;  Armstrong,  Lekezwa  and  Siebrits,  2008;  Armstrong  & 
Burger,  2009)  have  compared  the  actual  incidence  of  poverty  to  the  incidence  that 
would have obtained if all households had earned zero income from social grants. Such 
exercises are indicative only – they obviously are sensitive to the choice of a poverty 
line and rest on the very strong assumption that the availability or otherwise of social 
grants has no impact whatsoever on the behaviour of households in terms of labour 
supply, household formation patterns, et cetera – but nonetheless suggest that social 
grants markedly increase the incomes of very poor households in South Africa.25 
Table 7 summarises findings of such an analysis of data from Statistics South Africa's 
Income and Expenditure Survey 2005 (Armstrong and Burger, 2009). The table shows 
the impact of social grants at the three experimental poverty lines used  by Statistics 
South Africa: annual per capita incomes of R2 532, R3 864 and R7 116. At a poverty line 
of R2 532 per person per annum, social grants reduced the headcount poverty rate from 
45.5 percent  to  31.5 percent,  that  is,  by  13.9 percentage  points  or  30.5 percent.  The 
reality that the estimated impact on poverty was so much smaller at higher poverty 
lines  confirmed  the  effectiveness  of  the  grants  for  targeting  those  experiencing 
relatively severe poverty. Additional (albeit indirect) evidence of the poverty-reducing 
impact of social grants includes the drop in the headcount poverty rate from 50 percent 
                                                 
25 Other studies of the effects of specific grants (e.g. Case and Deaton, 1998; Barrientos, 2003) and the 
social grants system as a whole (e.g. Samson, Lee, Ndlebe, MacQuene, Van Niekerk, Gandhi, Harigaya and 
Abrahams, 2004) reached the same conclusion. 
Labour market and grant incomes by deciles (2008)
Source: Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent (2010: 78)
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in 1993 and a peak of 53 percent in 1996 to 39 percent in 2008 (Van der Berg, Louw 
and Yu, 2008: 68-70; The Presidency, 2009: 26)26 and the decrease in the portion of 
children  who  had  gone  hungry  in  the  previous  year  from  31  percent  in  2002  to 
16 percent in 2006 (Van der Berg, Louw and  Du Toit, 2009: 25). Other studies (e.g. 
Leibbrandt et al., 2010) have also argued that the expansion of the social assistance 
system has been a major driver of the fall in headcount poverty rates after 2000. 
  Table 7   
  Effects of social grants on poverty   
    Poverty rate (at annual poverty lines)    
  R2 532  R3 864  R7 116   
  Headcount ratio excluding grant income  45.5  55.0  67.6   
  Headcount ratio inclusive of grant income  31.6  47.3  65.3   
  Absolute change  13.9  7.7  2.3   
  Percentage change  30.5  14.0  3.4   
  Source: Armstrong and Burger (2009: 14)   
     
3.2.2  Developmental effects 
Providing well-targeted cash transfers to the poor is at best a necessary condition for 
reducing poverty: the actual impact of such transfers depends crucially on how poor 
people use the money. The most obvious threat to the poverty-mitigating potential of 
cash transfers is outright squandering of money on luxuries and so-called "sin goods" – 
a risk that has spawned a well-known (though far from conclusive) argument for the 
superiority of in-kind transfers over cash grants. Cognisance also should be taken of the 
distinction between the "livelihood protection" and "livelihood promotion" effects of 
anti-poverty interventions (cf. Devereux, 2002a: 661, 662). Livelihood protection effects 
have to do with consumption smoothing and maintenance of minimum living standards, 
while  livelihood  promotion  effects  involve  sustainable  poverty  reduction  through 
promotion of higher living standards in the longer term. Cash transfers traditionally 
were regarded as mechanisms for protecting livelihoods (e.g. during economic crises), 
but  more  recent  research  has  highlighted  that  such  transfers  can  contribute  to  the 
achievement  of  sustainable  poverty  reduction  if  the  recipients  invest  in  income-
generating activities, education, social networks and the acquisition of productive assets 
(Devereux,  2002a).  South  Africa's  social  grants  currently  are  not  structured  as 
livelihood-promoting  interventions,  being  targeted  at  needy  individuals  who  do  not 
form  part  of  the  economically  active  population.  However,  the  largest  group  of 
beneficiaries  are  poor  children,  who  receive  child  support  grants  or  live  in  multi-
generation households sustained by social pensions. These children will eventually join 
the  labour  force  and  the  grants  could  contribute  to  their  future  productivity  to  the 
extent that it is invested in their sustenance and education. This subsection discusses 
the findings of studies that have explored the impact of grant income on the spending 
                                                 
26 Calculated from the All Media and Products Survey dataset, these poverty rates show the portions of 
the population that lived on less than R388 per person per month in constant 2008 Rands. For more 
information on the dataset, see Van der Berg et al. (2008: 63-64).   22 
patterns  of  recipient  households  in  South  Africa,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the 
nutrition and school attendance of children. 
Du Toit and Neves (2009) have pointed out that at least two factors complicate efforts 
to uncover relationships between grant income and household spending patterns. The 
first (and best known) is that the fungibility of money makes it particularly difficult to 
establish how grant income is actually used. A less appreciated but equally important 
factor  is  that  decisions  on  the  use  of  grant  income  take  place  within  networks  of 
informal  social  protection  characterised  by  "complex  monetary  and  non-monetary 
debts, obligations, exchanges, claims, histories and links" (Du Toit and Neves, 2009: 20). 
These sets of influences on the spending of grant money tend to be fluid and household-
specific, and generalisation of survey results therefore is hazardous. 
Be that as it may, no evidence of large-scale squandering of grant money has come to 
light yet, and several studies have found that grant receipts boost the food spending of 
beneficiaries. The responses to a survey by De Koker, De Waal and Vorster (2006: 483, 
639-673) indicated that food is the first item on which about 75 percent of beneficiaries 
spent  their  grant  money,  and  50  to  60 percent  (depending  on  the  grant  type)  of 
recipients  spent  most  of  their  grant  money  on  food.27  Another survey found that  
households that received child support grants spent 55  percent of their incomes on 
food, compared to 53 percent in households that were eligible for but did not receive 
such grants (CASE, 2008: 31).28 Similarly, according to Samson, Lee, Ndlebe, MacQuene, 
Van Niekerk, Gandhi, Harigaya and Abrahams  (2004: 75-77), households who receive 
grants spent relatively more on basic necessities (food, fuel, housing, and household 
operations)  and  relatively  less  on  medical  care,  debt  service  a nd  tobacco  than 
households who did not receive grants.29  
Research  has  highlighted  the  nutritional  benefits  to  children  of  increases  in  food 
spending  associated with receipt of child support grants and social pensions. Using 
children's height-for-age ratios as ex post indicators of nutritional inputs, Aguero, Carter 
and Woolard (2007) found that children in KwaZulu-Natal benefitted significantly from 
receiving child support grants during the first 36 months of their lives. Using data from 
the  KwaZulu-Natal  Income  Dynamics  Study,  Yamauchi  (2005)  found  that  nutrition-
related  improvements  in  child  health  markedly  lowered  the  age  for  starting  school, 
increased  the  grade  reached,  and  reduced  grade  repetition  at  the  early  stage  of 
schooling. According to Williams (2007: 55-59), each grant received by a household 
markedly reduced the probability that any child in that household goes hungry. 
With regard to old-age pensions, it emerged that the gender of the recipient influenced 
the nutrition and health-status effects of social grants. Duflo (2003) studied trends in 
the weight-for-height ratios of African children following the large increases in social 
pensions during the late 1980s and early 1990s. On balance, she found that the weight-
for-height ratios of girls living in households with female pension recipients increased, 
                                                 
27 This study was undertaken by the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch 
University for the Department of Social Development. 
28 The survey was undertaken by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) for the Department of 
Social Development, the South African Social Security Agency and the United Nations Children’s Fund. 
29 This study used data generated by the October 2000  Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), linked to 
data from the September 2000 Labour Force Survey and earlier October Household Surveys.   23 
while  no  increases  were  discernable  in  the  same  ratios  of  boys  or  girls  living  in 
households with male pension recipients. Samson et al. (2004: 82) and Lund (2006) 
also found that the nutrition of families with female pension recipients was more likely 
to improve than those with male recipients. 
The  evidence  suggested  that  receipt  of  child  support  grants  and  old-age  pensions 
encouraged school attendance among child support grant recipients and children living 
with  pensioners  (Case,  Hosegood  and  Lund,  2005;  Budlender  and  Woolard,  2006; 
Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 62-63).30 On the whole, the positive effects on attendance were 
small in absolute terms  –  a  reflection  of  the  relatively  high  school  enrolment  and 
attendance rates in South Africa (cf. section 4.4.2) – but implied significant reductions in 
non-attendance (Budlender and Woolard, 2006: viii). 
3.2.3  Incentive effects 
The labour market 
As was indicated earlier, the vehicle for the provision of unemployment benefits to able-
bodied  South  Africans  is  the  Unemployment  Insurance  Fund  –  a  contribution-based 
social  insurance  institution.  People  with  disabilities  are  the  only  members  of  the 
working-age  population  who  qualify  for  grants  (subject  to  the  means  test).  This, 
however, does not mean that the South African social assistance system has no impact 
on labour-market participation whatsoever. Research has shown that the grant system 
has important labour-market ramifications, but these do not arise primarily as a result 
of the mechanism normally emphasised by economic theory, namely distortion of the 
relative  prices  of  work  and  leisure.  Responses  to  the  Human  Sciences  Research 
Council's  South  African  Social  Attitudes  Survey  showed  that  poor  South  Africans 
generally  prefer  labour-market  income  to  the  currently  available  grants:  in  2006, 
67.1 percent of those not working for pay (including 75.3 percent of the unemployed) 
indicated that they do not regard themselves as better off claiming grants than working 
(Noble, Ntshongwana and Surender, 2008: 15-16). Instead, the grants system seems to 
influence  the  supply  of  labour  through  direct  and  induced  effects  on  retirement 
decisions, household formation and job search activities.  
Directs effects have to do with the incentives faced by the actual recipients of grants. 
The  means  test  discourages  elderly  people  of  limited  means  from  working  after 
reaching the age of eligibility by imposing an effective marginal tax rate of 50 percent on 
non-pension  incomes  exceeding  R606 per  month  (R7 272 per  annum).31  A  similar 
poverty trap arises in the case of the disability grant, which is subject to the same means 
test. In the South African context, this discouraging effect of the means tests is likely to 
be exacerbated by the exceptionally high unemployment rate a nd other labour-market 
disadvantages faced by elderly and disabled South Africans (many members of these 
                                                 
30 The only exception to this pattern was a survey-based study of the impact of the child support grant; 
which reported "… no discernable difference in levels of school attendance between children aged seven 
to 13 years who are receiving the grant and those who are not" (CASE, 2008: 39). 
31 The formula D = 1.3A  – 0.5B (with D the monthly pension payable, A the maximum monthly pension 
payable, and B the monthly private income of the beneficiary) implies that the maximum monthly pension 
of R1 010 is paid to recipients with private incomes of R606 per month or less. The monthly value of the 
pension decreases by 50c for every R1 of private income available to the recipient above R606 per month 
and falls to zero when private income reaches R2 426 per month.   24 
groups have limited skills and reside in rural areas where job opportunities are scarce). 
An  additional  factor  affecting  people  with  disabilities  is  that  the  available  job 
opportunities tend to be temporary and low-paid (Lund, 1998: 12). The resulting small 
differential between the disability grant and the available market  wages means that 
there is little incentive for a person with a disability to take up paid work.32  
Several empirical studies have explored the induced labour-market effects of elements 
of the South African social assistance system, that is, effects on persons other than the 
actual recipients. There are the strong indications that the social pension has become a 
major source of support for unemployed South Africans of working age, especially in the 
rural areas (cf.  Case  and  Deaton,  1998;  Keller,  2004;  Klasen  and  Woolard,  2008). 
Unemployed youths and younger adults often delay forming new households or return 
to  their  parents  or  relatives  to  share  in  the  pension  income  of  the  elderly.  Such 
attachment  to  households  with  pension  recipients  apparently  affects  labour-market 
participation in two ways. Some individuals stop looking for work when they join such 
households, often because they are located in rural areas where job opportunities are 
scarce  (Klasen  and  Woolard,  2008:  5).33  Researchers  who  have  included  migrant 
absentees in their definitions of households, however, found that access to pen sion 
income stimulates labour-market participation by enabling some household members 
to undertake job search away from home (cf. Posel, Fairburn and Lund, 2006; Sienaert, 
2008). Such positive effects are particularly strong for women. 
Williams (2007) found that receipt of child-support grants positively influenced labour-
force participation by caregivers, but apparently did not affect their search behaviour or 
actual employment: 
…receiving a CSG may give a mother some income stability and alleviate 
[sic] her enough from domestic duties and immediate subsistence needs 
that she is capable of holding a job. This would account for an increase in 
broad participation. However, if the means test income threshold is likely 
to  be  a  binding  constraint  for  her,  this  willingness  to  work  may  not 
translate immediately into active job search and employment – she may 
be  passively  network-searching  for  an  employment  opportunity  that 
compensates her enough for the loss of her CSG. 
Major labour-supply effects, however, are unlikely in view of the relatively small value 
of  the  child  support  grant  (cf.  CASE,  2008:  27).  This  was  corroborated  by  another 
finding of the South African Social Attitudes Survey: 70.6 percent of the respondents 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that the child support grant was 
too high and discouraged job-seeking (Noble, Ntshongwana and Surender, 2008: 15). 
Saving 
As was indicated above, the means test imposes an onerous effective marginal tax rate 
of 50 percent on non-pension incomes exceeding R606 per month (R7 272 per annum). 
                                                 
32 Johannsmeier (2007: 62) pointed out that this is especially true as far as casual and temporary jobs are 
concerned. 
33  Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003) also found that the presence in households of pension 
recipients was correlated with reduced labour supply by household members of working age.   25 
Hence, the means-tested nature of the social old-age pension reduces the incentive for 
low-income earners to save for retirement (National Treasury, 2004b: 11). The means 
test sometimes penalises lower-income workers with inadequate occupational pensions 
to such an extent that their retirement incomes (i.e. the sum of the occupational and 
social pensions) are only slightly higher than those of others who have contributed for 
much shorter periods. The actual impact of this disincentive on the savings decisions of 
lower-income workers behaviour has not been established empirically yet. 
Fertility 
Public discourse has been indicative of concern about the possibility that the availability 
of child support grants has been encouraging needy women (especially teenagers) to 
have  more  children.  Empirical  evidence  on  this  issue  remains  scant,  but  Makiwane, 
Desmond,  Richter  and  Udjo  (2006)  argued  that  there  are  least  three  reasons  for 
suspecting that the introduction of the child support grant has not had a major impact 
on the prevalence of teenage pregnancy in South Africa: 
  The incidence of teenage pregnancy has increased in all sections of society over 
time, including those that are not eligible for means-tested child support grants. 
This suggests that forces other than the desire to access grants are at work. 
  The incidence of teenage pregnancy increased markedly in South Africa during 
the mid-1990s, but then levelled off around the turn of the millennium. Hence, it 
does not appear as if the introduction of the child support grant, which occurred 
in 1998, had a strong positive impact on teenage pregnancy. 
  If large numbers of teenagers were falling pregnant to access grants, one would 
have expected a very high take-up of the child support grant among teenage 
mothers. Yet this has not been the case. In the period from 1998 to 2006, some 
15 percent of babies in South Africa were born to teenage mothers, but teenagers 
constituted only three percent of the beneficiaries of child support grants. 
Incentives matter at the margin; hence, the availability of the grant may have tilted the 
cost-benefit calculations of some in favour of having more children. In all likelihood, 
however, a small grant of R250 per month or less would have been a decisive factor in 
the  reproductive  decisions  of  only  a  relatively  small  number  of  people.  Given  the 
absence  of  clear  evidence  of  increases  in  the  incidence  of  teenage  pregnancy  or  of 
reductions  in  the  age  of  first  conception  since  2000,  the  introduction  of  the  child 
support grant probably at most has slightly slowed the ongoing decline in the fertility 
rate in South Africa compared to what would have happened otherwise. 
Health 
The impact of HIV/Aids on prime-aged individuals is such that the household usually 
foregoes the income of the affected member. HIV/Aids-infected individuals qualify for 
disability grants when they become physically unable to work, but payment of such 
grants  is  terminated  if  their  health  status  improves  sufficiently.  Highly  Active  Anti-
retroviral Treatment (HAART) usually achieves such restoration of health within six 
months  (Venkataramani,  Maughan-Brown,  Nattrass  and  Rugeres,  2009:  2).  Nattrass 
(2006a; 2006b) first pointed out that this policy could give rise to perverse incentives: 
given the difficulty of finding employment in the labour-surplus South African economy,   26 
HIV/Aids sufferers may be tempted to avoid or discontinue Highly Active Anti-retroviral 
Treatment (HAART) in order to remain eligible for disability grants. In a study involving 
a  large  sample  of  the  residents  of  the  Khayelitsha  Township  in  Cape  Town, 
Venkataramani  et  al.  (2009)  found  no  evidence  of  individuals  compromising  their 
health in this manner. They did find, however, that losing the disability grant as a result 
of successful anti-retroviral treatment often subjected individuals and households to 
sharp decreases in incomes (Venkataramani et al., 2009: 9-10). 
4  REFORM ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
The growth performance of the South African economy has improved markedly from 
1994 onwards. The protracted stagnation in per capita income came to an end: real per 
capita  GDP  at constant 2000 prices, which  had  decreased  from R21 167 in 1970 to 
R19 996 in 1993, increased at an  average annual rate  of 1.67 percent  after 1994 to 
reach R25 897 in 2008 (South African Reserve Bank, 2009: S-149). The poor, however, 
benefitted  to  a  limited  extent  only  from  the  accompanying  increase  in  personal 
incomes.34 As was indicated in section 3.2.1, t he headcount poverty rate decreased by 
14 percentage points from 53 percent in 1996 to 39 percent in 2008, but a significant 
portion of this drop resulted from the expansion of the social grants system. Moreover, 
in 2008 fully 39 percent of the South African population still lived on R388 per month or 
less (cf. Figure 6). 
Figure 6 
 
This state of affairs is ample reason for reflection on the future role of the social grants 
system in anti-poverty policy in South Africa. The remainder of this section provides 
                                                 
34 Personal or primary income is the actual value of income received in cash or in kind by individuals and 
households. Secondary income is primary incomes minus direct taxation plus the value of government 
services consumed. 
Sources: 1993-2007 – Van der Berg, Louw and Yu (2008: 70); 2008 – The Presidency (2009: 26)
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such reflection. Section 4.1 discusses the relationship between economic growth and 
employment creation in South Africa. It shows that job-creating economic growth is 
crucial for overcoming poverty, but also identifies factors which hamper employment 
creation and, hence, progress in reducing poverty. Against this background, and with 
reference to the current fiscal situation and recent policy developments, Section 4.2 
comments on the future role of the social grants system in anti-poverty policy in South 
Africa. This section also briefly discusses the potential of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme  (EPWP)  and  the  recently  announced  youth  wage  subsidy  schemes  as 
alternatives to further expanding the scope of the social grants system. Sections 4.3 and 
4.4 discuss two sets of possible reforms to the social assistance system that are being 
debated  or  implemented  in  South  Africa:  child-focused  conditional  cash  transfer 
programmes and so-called "new-style" workfare programmes. 
4.1  Economic growth, job creation and poverty in South Africa 
In developing countries, relatively low per capita incomes limit the scope for reducing 
poverty by redistributing existing resources. As was emphasised by Bhorat (2004: 944), 
job-creating economic growth therefore is the primary vehicle for sustainable poverty 
reduction: 
It  is  the  labour  market  that  ultimately  lies  at  the  centre  of  access  to 
income  (or  lack  thereof)  in  the  long  run.  A  well-performing,  job-
generating  labour  market  remains  the  key  long-run  mechanism  for 
reducing the poverty and inequality levels in the domestic economy.35 
The links among economic growth, job creation, unemployment and poverty may seem 
self-evident, but the experience of the  early and mid-1990s  cast doubts about their 
validity in the then South African context. At the time,  the South African economy shed 
jobs while output was expanding (albeit slowly), causing some to fear that the country 
was facing the bleak prospect of persistent "jobless growth" (cf. Hodge, 2009: 497-498). 
Such fears, however, proved to be unfounded. The fall in total employment during this 
period  of  positive  economic  growth  resulted  from  sector-specific  developments  in 
manufacturing  (possibly  related  to  trade  liberalisation)  and,  especially,  gold  mining 
(Hodge, 2009: 502). Moreover, 2.5 million new formal-sector and informal-sector jobs 
were  created  between  September  2001  and  September  2008  as  economic  growth 
continued and accelerated (The Presidency, 2009: 20). 
Using the data depicted in Figure 7, Hodge (2009: 497-498) pointed out that the period 
of "jobless growth" during the early and mid-1990s represented an aberration: since 
World  War  II,  employment  growth  often  lagged  output  growth  in  South  Africa,  but 
negative  employment elasticities  of  economic  growth  have  been  rare.  Hodge  (2009: 
497)  estimated  the  long-term  average  ratio  between  employment  growth  and  real 
economic growth as about 0.5, that is, a 1 percentage point increase in economic growth 
is associated with half a percentage point increase in employment growth. According to 
the  National  Treasury  (2010a:  43),  the  employment  elasticity  of  economic  growth 
reached 0.66 from 2003 to 2008 – a level that compared favourably with estimates for 
other countries by the International Labour Organisation. 
                                                 
35 As was indicated in section 3.1, this proposition is at the heart of the anti-poverty strategy of the South 
African Government.   28 
Figure 7 
 
Employment growth during the post-1994 period nonetheless has been inadequate to 
sharply reduce unemployment and poverty in South Africa. Unemployment was already 
Source: Hodge (2009: 503)
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high at the time of democratisation – the 1995 October Household Survey reported 
narrow and broad unemployment rates of 17.6 percent and 30.8 percent, respectively 
(Yu, 2008: 32) – and increased further during the second half of the 1990s and the early 
years of the millennium.36 The narrow and broad unemployment rates peaked in March 
2003 (at 31.2 percent and 42.5 percent, respectively), and then decreased as economic 
growth accelerated, reaching lows of 23.0 percent in September 2007 and 30.2 percent 
in September 2008 (The Presidency, 2009: 21).  Job losses resulting from the global 
financial crisis partially reversed this progress, however, and by the end of  2009 the 
narrow unemployment rate had risen to 24.3 percent (National Treasury, 2010a: 39).37 
International  comparisons  of  unemployment  are  fraught  with  problems,  but  the 
evidence suggests that these are exceptionally high rates of open unemployment. Before 
the recent recession, for example, 44  percent of the working-age population in South 
Africa had jobs, compared to the international average of 60 percent (National Treasury, 
2010a: 37-38; cf. also Kingdon and Knight, 2004: 391-392). 
Research has suggested that supply-side and demand-side factors have hampered the 
ability of the South African economy to create enough jobs. On the supply side, South 
Africa has experienced rapid labour-force growth, especially during the second half of 
the 1990s (Hodge, 2009: 499-500).38 The labour force has expanded much more rapidly 
than the working-age population (Kingdon and Knight, 2007: 816-819), which implied 
that labour-force participation rates increased markedly.39 Burger and Woolard (2005: 
5-8) and Kingdon and Knight  (2007: 816-819) ascribed the increase in participation 
rates – which has been particularly noticeable among African women − to actual and 
perceived  improvements  in  employment  opportunities  following  the  scrapping  of 
apartheid-era  restrictions  on  the  mobility  of  Africans  and  the  introduction  of 
employment-equity legislation, rising education levels, and rapid growth in the number 
of households because of factors such as changes in household structure and HIV/Aid-
related deaths among households heads. 
As was indicated above, inadequate economic growth has been the major demand-side 
factor  that  has  hampered  job  creation  in  South  Africa.  Furthermore,  mismatches 
between the supply of and the demand for labour have constrained the labour intensity 
of  economic  growth.  Most  notably,  the  economy  has  experienced  considerable 
structural  change  since  1970,  with  the  primary  sectors  (agriculture  and  mining) 
shedding labour and new job opportunities arising in tertiary sectors such as finance, 
wholesale  and  retail  trade  and  community,  social  and  personal  services  (Banerjee, 
Galiani, Levinsohn, McLaren and Woolard, 2009: 723-724; National Treasury, 2010a: 
40). These changes have contributed to an increase in the demand for more skilled 
                                                 
36 The narrow unemployment rate (the official unemployment rate in South Africa) is the percentage of 
the labour force that was without work in the week preceding an interview conducted as part of an 
official labour-market survey, has taken active steps to look for work and was available for work. The 
broad  unemployment  rate  is  the  percentage  of  the  labour  force  that  was  without  work  in  the  week 
preceding such an interview and was available for work.  
37 Total employment fell by 870 000 during 2009 alone (National Treasury, 2010a: 39). 
38 Labour-force growth has slowed sharply from 2000 onwards,  averaging only 0.7 percent per annum 
from 2000 to 2007 (Hodge, 2009: 500). 
39 Kingdon and Knight (2007: 816-819) pointed out that immigration also contributed to rapid labour -
force growth. Much immigration, however, has been informal or illegal and the extent of this contribution 
is therefore difficult to quantify.   30 
labour accompanied by a fall in the demand for unskilled labour that has markedly 
worsened the employment prospects of the large unskilled portion of the South African 
labour force (Burger and Woolard, 2005: 16-18). 
Table 8 confirms that the skills composition of employment has shifted from unskilled 
and semi-skilled to skilled labour since 1995. Only 17.7 percent of the new jobs created 
from 1995 until 2008 required unskilled workers and by 2008 only 22.8 percent of all 
jobs were classified as “unskilled”. Fully 46.4 percent of the new jobs created between 
1995 and 2008 were in the semi-skilled category, but this category's share of all jobs 
also  decreased.  By  contrast,  the  portions  of  all  job  requiring  skilled  workers  had 
increased from 21.8 percent in 1995 to 26.1 percent in 2008. 
  Table 8   
  The skills composition of employment (1995-2008)   
  Year  Percentages   
Unskilled  Semi-skilled  Skilled 
1995  25.1  53.1  21.8 
2004  23.4  52.7  23.9 
2008  22.8  51.0  26.1 
Job growth (1995-2008)  17.7  46.4  35.9 
  Source: National Treasury (2010a: 41)   
     
The relationship between labour-market institutions and outcomes is a controversial 
aspect  of  the  unemployment  debate  in  South  Africa.  Since  1995,  the  Government 
promulgated a series of laws that have substantially  changed the complex of labour-
market institutions.40 Some economists (e.g. Arora and Ricci, 2005: 25-30) have argued 
that aspects of this institutional framework – including the laws governing collective 
bargaining processes and working conditions – have contributed to high unemployment 
in  South  Africa  by  rendering  the  labour  market  inflexible.  The  South  African 
Government long resisted calls for the reform of this framework, having invested much 
political capital in its establishment. However, the following passage in the 2010 Budget 
Review (National Treasury, 2010a: 48-49) may have indicated the emergence of greater 
willingness to consider reforms to this framework: 
South Africa has a well-developed labour-market regulatory environment, 
including  effective  employment  protection  legislation.  In  its  2008 
Economic  Assessment  of  South  Africa,  the  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  indicates  that  employment 
protection  is  broadly  in  line  with  international  standards  and  is 
"relatively flexible". The OECD suggests, however, that the resolution of 
labour disputes and dismissals is slow and cumbersome, raising the costs 
and  perceived  risks  to  employers.  Such  difficulties  inhibit  new  hiring, 
since firms are reluctant to hire inexperienced workers when it is costly 
                                                 
40 The most important pieces of legislation were the Labour Relations Act (1995), the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (1997), the Employment Equity Act (1998), and the Skills Development Act (1998).   31 
to dismiss poor performers. It seems likely that improved implementation 
of labour protection legislation, together with adjustments to regulations 
where  required,  would  contribute  to  better  outcomes  for  both 
employment and industrial development. 
Labour-market  institutions  such  as  collective  bargaining  frameworks  affect  wage 
determination  in  various  ways.41  Wage trends have varied since 1994, with rapid 
growth in some sectors   (e.g.  manufacturing, where  real wages increased more  than 
40 percent between 1992 and 2008) and sluggish growth in others (e.g. the informal 
economy) (National Treasury, 2010a: 42). Data comparability issues have complicated 
analysis of overall trends in real wages: thus, Burger and Yu (2006) claimed that real 
wages  increased  by  4 percent  from  1995  until  2005,  while  Banerjee  et  al.  (2009) 
estimated  a  drop  of  10 percent  for  the  same  period.  Consistent  with  this  estimate, 
Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn and Woolard (2006) argued that excessive wage growth 
was not a strong driver of the increase in unemployment in South Africa between 1995 
and 2003. They added, however, that real wages did not fall enough to clear the labour 
market, partly because of the power of labour unions but also because the required 
drop was too large to be acceptable politically and socially (cf. Banerjee et al., 2006: 4). 
Analysis of the South African labour market has highlighted two additional constraints 
to overcoming the unemployment problem. First, the legacy of apartheid-era spatial 
planning  (which  separated  Black  job  seekers  from  job  opportunities)  and  residual 
vestiges  of  racial  discrimination  may  well  undermine  the  effectiveness  of  search 
processes in the labour market (Banerjee et al., 2009: 734). Second, young people seem 
to  experience  exceptional  difficulty  in  obtaining  their  first  jobs  and  are  affected 
particularly harshly by the scarcity of jobs.42 Firms apparently put a high premium on 
work experience when making hiring decisions, possibly as a screening mechanism in 
an environment where virtually all younger workers now have at least ten years of 
formal education (Banerjee et al., 2009: 736-737). 
Another notable feature of the South African labour market highlighted by Kingdon and 
Knight  (2004:  391-392)  is  the  small  size  of  the  informal  sector:  in  contrast  to  the 
situation in most developing countries, the informal sector apparently has not expanded 
rapidly to compensate for the scarcity of formal-sector jobs.43 In the fourth quarter of 
2009,  for  example,  some  2.1  million  workers  were  act ive  in  the  non-agricultural 
informal  sector  while  5. 8 million  were  either  openly  unemployed  or  classified  as 
discouraged work-seekers (Statistics South Africa, 2009a: vi). 
                                                 
41 A well-known example is the centralisation of wage bargaining, in terms of which large firms and 
labour  unions  can  extend  arbitration  agreements  to  all  workers  in  defined  bargaining  council  areas, 
including those employed by smaller non-unionised firms. Magruder (2010) found that such agreements 
reduce employment in particular industries by 8 to 13 percent, with small firms affected most. 
42 According to the National Treasury (2010a: 51, 42), more than 3 million young people do not work, and 
fully 73 percent of the unemployed are in the 15-35 age group. 
43 According to Heintz and Posel (2008: 2008), a comparison of Statistics South Africa and International 
Labour Organisation data for 2006 confirm that the ratios between non -agricultural employment in the 
informal sector and total employment were markedly hi gher in Latin and Northern American middle -
income countries such as Argentina (36.1  percent), Brazil (40.6  percent), Mexico (38.0  percent) and 
Paraguay (50.1 percent) than in South Africa (18.5 percent). Data on the sizes of informal sectors in sub -
Saharan African and Asian developing countries also suggest that the informal sector in South Africa is 
unusually small (cf. Kingdon and Knight, 2004: 391-392).   32 
Two explanations come to mind for the reality that the informal sector in South Africa is 
much smaller than what one would expect in view of the extent of unemployment (cf. 
Kingdon and Knight, 2004: 393). The supply-side explanation is that a large portion of 
the unemployed may prefer not to join the informal sector, either because they have 
access to alternative forms of income which enable them to exercise a preference for 
leisure  over  work  or  because  informal-sector  participation  hampers  searching  for 
preferred formal-sector jobs. The implication of this explanation is that a considerable 
portion  of  South  Africa's  unemployment  is  voluntary.  The  demand-side  explanation 
hinges on the existence of barriers of entry which prevent unemployed workers from 
joining the informal sector, in which case unemployment would be involuntary. 
In  a  careful  study  of  the  evidence,  Kingdon  and  Knight  (2004)  found  no  conclusive 
evidence of widespread involuntary unemployment in South Africa (cf. also Heintz and 
Posel, 2008). The "luxury unemployment" interpretation of joblessness is unrealistic: 
survey  evidence  has  consistently  found  that  informal-sector  workers  are  markedly 
better off in terms of income and expenditure than the unemployed, and members of 
the former group tended to be markedly more satisfied with their living standards than 
members  of  the  latter  (Kingdon  and  Knight,  2004:  395-401).  Hence,  it  seems  most 
unlikely that social grants or any other form of non-wage income makes it unnecessary 
for the unemployed to join the informal sector. Kingdon and Knight (2004: 403-404) 
interpreted this as evidence of the existence of significant barriers to entry into the 
informal  sector,  including  factors  such  as  the  impact  of  apartheid  education  and 
restrictions  on  the  development  of  entrepreneurial  skills  among  blacks,  crime  and 
insecurity, inadequate government support, and the lack of credit for start-up capital. 
Future trends in economic growth and job creation will be major determinants of the 
numbers of people who will need government assistance in the form of social grants or 
other interventions. Table 9 provides rough estimates of the extent of job creation and 
changes in unemployment numbers and rates that could result from constant economic 
growth  rates  of  3 percent  and  6 percent  between  2009  and  2019,  given  certain 
assumptions regarding labour-force growth and the employment intensity of growth.44 
Crude as they are, these projections illustrate important aspects of the links among 
economic growth, job creation and unemployment in South Africa. The estimated effects 
of an economic growth rate of 3  percent per annum indicate that even comparatively 
modest rates of economic growth should contribute to job creation and reductions in 
the unemployment rate, but not necessarily the absolute number of unemployed. Such 
growth rates clearly will not materially reduce the number of poor people dependent on 
anti-poverty  interventions  (including  social  grants  targeted  at  economically  inactive 
vulnerable  groups).  Both  the  Gear  and  Asgisa  strategies  were  aimed  at  achieving 
economic growth rates of 6 percent per annum. The projected effects suggest that such 
growth rates should result in large-scale job creation and marked reductions in the 
unemployment rate and the number of unemployed. Yet the extent of joblessness in 
South Africa is such that even a decade of rapid growth and job creation could leave 
almost 10 percent of the labour force (roughly 1.9 million work seekers) unemployed. 
                                                 
44 These assumptions are as follows: (i) the employment intensity of economic growth will remain at its 
long-run average of 0.5; (ii) the working-age population will grow at a rate of 1.2 percent per annum (as 
in 2009), and (iii) the labour-force participation rate will remain constant at its 2009 level of 55 percent. 
Hence, the exercise ignores the possibility of changes in the number of discouraged work seekers.   33 
  Table 9   
  Projections of job creation and unemployment (2009-2019)   
    2009  2019  Change   
Working-age population ('000)  31 261  35 184  3 923 
Labour force ('000)  17 138  19 351  2 213 
Economic growth of 3 percent per annum: 
Employment ('000)  12 974  15 057  2 083 
Unemployment ('000)  4 164  4 294  130 
Unemployment rate (%)  24.3  22.2  -2.1 
Economic growth of 6 percent growth per annum: 
Employment ('000)  12 974  17 436  4 462 
Unemployment ('000)  4 164  1 915  -2 249 
Unemployment rate (%)  24.3  9.9  -14.4 
  Source of 2009 data: Statistics South Africa (2009a)   
     
4.2  The future role of social grants in South African anti-poverty policy 
A brief discussion of the determinants of poverty and of categories of interventions to 
address them is a useful starting point for discussing the possible future role of social 
grants as an element of anti-poverty policy in South Africa. Devereux (2002a: 658-660) 
identified three causes of poverty, each of which requires particular interventions: 
  Chronic  poverty  often  results  from  low  productivity,  that  is,  an  inability  to 
generate  adequate  returns  from  labour  and  other  productive  inputs.  Low 
productivity often is related to unemployment or underemployment, especially 
in developing countries. The aim of interventions to address such poverty should 
be to facilitate income generation by raising productivity.  
  Transitory poverty usually is related to vulnerability to temporary falls in returns 
to labour or temporary increases in irreducible expenses. Two factors determine 
the extent of vulnerability of a household: the likelihood that it will be affected by 
a particular shock ("exposure") and its ability to cope with the shock and its 
effects ("susceptibility"). Depending on the causes of vulnerability, appropriate 
interventions  could  include  direct  cash  transfers,  microfinance  programmes 
aimed at smoothing consumption, and measures to restore productivity. 
  Another  major  cause  of  poverty  is  dependency,  which  comes  about  because 
personal characteristics (such as disabilities, old age or childhood) prevent some 
persons from earning an independent living. Direct cash transfers are the best 
interventions to address dependency-related poverty. 
As was indicated in section 2.1 of this paper, the South African social assistance system 
was designed to mitigate dependency-related poverty: grants are provided to needy 
members of vulnerable groups who are not members of the labour force (the disabled 
and poor children and elderly individuals). Section 3 showed that the grants system is   34 
effective  at  addressing  this  particular  manifestation  of  poverty.  The  various  social 
grants  are  well  targeted  and  have  a  significant  mitigating  impact  on  poverty. 
Uncertainty remains about aspects of the utilisation and incentive effects of the grants, 
but  systematic  evidence  of  widespread  squandering  of  grant  income  and  severe 
undesirable behavioural effects are yet to come to light. Furthermore, the child support 
grant and the old-age pension are used widely to enhance the nutrition and schooling of 
children, which represents investments in the human capital and productivity of future 
workers. 
Although direct social assistance in the form of non-contributory grants is not available 
to the unemployed, the existing grants do impact on chronic poverty resulting from low 
productivity.  This  happens  when  grants  (especially  old-age  pensions)  are  used  to 
sustain unemployed labour-force members in multi-generational households. Section 
3.2.3 showed that such sharing of grant  income acts as a safety net and sometimes 
facilitates labour-market participation, but also ties some of the unemployed to rural 
areas where jobs are scarce. Furthermore, it carries the risk of diluting grant money to 
such  an  extent  that  all  members  of  households  supporting  unemployed  persons 
(including the targeted beneficiaries) could be dragged into poverty. 
The case for maintaining the existing targeted social grants is very strong. These grants 
effectively assist poverty groups who otherwise would be extremely vulnerable in an 
environment where large-scale structural unemployment and the HIV/Aids pandemic 
put considerable pressure on informal social security systems. South Africa recently 
followed  a  growing  number  of  countries  by  adding  conditions  to  a  social  grants 
programme  targeted  at  needy  children.  The  purpose  of  conditional  cash  transfer 
schemes is to strengthen the developmental impact of social assistance systems. Section 
4.4 discusses the merits of such interventions from a South African perspective. 
The most vexing questions regarding the future of the South African social assistance 
system  stem  from  the  reality  that  it  was  not  designed  to  mitigate  chronic  poverty 
resulting from structural unemployment.45 The absence of dedicated assistance to th e 
long-term unemployed has restricted the ability of the social grants system to reduce 
poverty  in  two  ways:  first,  by  excluding  large  numbers  of  poor  households  from 
coverage and; second, by giving rise to grant sharing that dilutes the benefits of those 
who are covered. As was indicated in section 3.1, the Government wisely has rejected 
calls to address this gap in the social assistance system by means of the adoption of a 
universal income grant. The introduction of such an expensive programme clearly wil l 
be out of the question in the next few years in view of the need for fiscal consolidation, 
and it is unlikely to be sustainable in macroeconomic terms thereafter as well ( cf. 
Thurlow, 2002; Van der Berg, 2002). The numbers may be different eight years down 
the line, but Van der Berg's (2002: 7) comment on the effectiveness of a basic income 
grant as an anti-poverty instrument remains valid: 
                                                 
45 The social assistance system came into being in the interwar period to meet the needs of whites. At the 
time, job reservation and higher education and skill levels assured most whites of employment, and they 
mainly  needed  cover  against  cyclical  unemployment,  which  was  usually  mild  and  of  relatively  short 
duration. The cover provided by the Unemployment Insurance Fund was adequate for this purpose, and 
there was no need for social grants to address structural unemployment.   35 
The  BIG  uses  a  sledgehammer  where  this  is  clearly  an  inappropriate 
instrument.  To transfer perhaps another R22 billion to the poorest forty 
percent of the population (already an overly ambitious goal that would 
stretch fiscal resources), it proposes that another R32 billion be paid to 
the  not so poor, some of  whom would then have  to pay taxes of  R65 
billion to fund all of this (including the costs of transfers). 
A basic income grant also is likely to be a disincentive to labour-market participation 
and could contribute to unhealthy welfare dependency among the poor. Moreover, the 
introduction of such a large entitlement programme represents a form of "open-ended 
fiscal exposure" which may expose future governments to strong pressure for increases 
in the amount of the grants (cf. Coleman, 2002: 22). 
Two interventions currently provide assistance to the unemployed: the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) and the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). The impacts 
of these interventions are considerable, but inadequate. As was indicated in section 
2.1.2,  the  National  Treasury  (2010a:  107)  reported  that  the  UIF  disbursed  about 
R495.8 million per month to an average of 207 967 beneficiaries during the first nine 
months  of  2009/10.  Hence,  the  Fund  assisted  some  5 percent  of  the  more  than 
4.1 million unemployed members of the labour force (this ratio falls to about 4 percent 
if the more than 1 million discouraged work seekers are also taken into consideration). 
One of the main reasons why this ratio is so low is that most of the unemployed have 
never worked and therefore do not qualify for UIF assistance.46 Executives of the UIF 
recently informed the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Labour that the Fund is 
giving consideration to raising the income replacement rate and extending the period 
during which benefits are provided from 238 days to 365 (Ensor, 2010). 
The target of the fir st phase of the EPWP, which ran from 2004 until 2009, was the 
creation of 1 million short-term work opportunities (i.e. 650 000 full-time equivalent 
jobs).47 Table 10 shows that the EPWP achieved this target by creating  1 709 675 work 
opportunities in net terms. The Programme clearly had a significant impact: apart from 
providing work opportunities equivalent to full -time employment for roughly 10 to 
15 percent of the unemployed, it supplied more than 7.1 million person-days of training, 
and wage payments to workers amounted to at least R 6 725.9 million at an average 
minimum daily rate of R53 (Department of Public Works, 2009: 110).48 
EPWP wage disbursements nonetheless were relatively small compared to total outlays 
on the Programme (R49 687 million) and the  total spending on social grants over the 
same period (R285 807 million).49 Phase II of the EPWP, which commenced in 2009, 
                                                 
46 The Labour Force Survey of September 2007 indicated that 55 percent of the unemployed have never 
worked (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 48). 
47 A full-time job opportunity is defined as one that  provides a minimum of 230 hours of work per year 
(Altman and Hemson, 2007: 10). 
48 The wage bill to employees was calculated as the product of the number of person-days of work and the 
average daily minimum wage (cf. footnote 4 to table 11). As such, it represents a lower-bound estimate of 
total wage payments. Official EPWP documentation does not provide more exact wage bill data. 
49 High non-wage costs often reduce the poverty impact of public works programmes ( Vodopivec, 2006: 
66-67). To be sure, the purpose of most such programmes extends beyond supplying workers with cash 
wages: training and the creation and maintenance of infrastructure usually are important goals as well. 
This is the basis of the distinction between two types of public works progra mmes, namely  labour-  36 
represents a major expansion of the Programme and also aims to address some of the 
weaknesses of the first phase by increasing the lengths of work opportunities and the 
labour intensity of projects (National Treasury, 2010a: 50). Total spending is expected 
to amount to R52 billion over the next three years, and the aim is to create 4.5 million 
short-term jobs lasting 100 days on average (National Treasury, 2010a: 51). According 
to the Department of Public Works (2009: 142), this target is the equivalent of slightly 
more than 2 million full-time jobs, that is, some 650 000 jobs per annum. The possible 
contribution of the second phase of the EPWP to the reduction of joblessness should be 
assessed against the scale of the unemployment problem in South Africa: as was shown 
in section 4.2, even exceptional economic performance over the next decade (a constant 
real output growth rate of 6 percent per annum) is likely to only reduce the number of 




  Outcomes of Phase 1 of the Expanded Public Works Programme (2004-2009)   
  Year  Expenditure  Net work  Average daily  Wages paid to   
(R'000 000)1  opportunities2  minimum wage  Employees 
     (R)3  (R'000 000)4 
  2004/2005  3 158  174 845  50  823.2   
2005/2006  2 482  208 898  48  635.7 
2006/2007  7 204  316 814  41  917.5 
2007/2008  13 640  439 099  44  1 720.6 
2008/2009  23 203  570 019  64  2 628.9 
Total  49 687  1 709 675  53  6 725.9 
  Source:  Department of Public Works (2009: 150, 158, 170, 182, 194)   
  Notes:  1  Including professional fees   
    2  Gross work opportunities minus possible work opportunities if the projects had been   
      undertaken machine-intensively (i.e. opportunities added by the EPWP).   
    3  For manual workers   
    4  Product of the minimum wage and the number of person-days of work   
     
The South African Government recently announced another intervention aimed at job 
creation, namely a wage subsidy scheme. The purpose of this scheme (which is expected 
to be in operation early in 2011) will be to encourage firms to hire young work seekers 
without work experience (Gordhan, 2010: 10). It is envisaged that the scheme will  use 
the SARS payroll tax platform to provide a cash reimbursement to employers for a two-
year period. To qualify for the subsidy, participating businesses, municipalities and non-
governmental organisations will be expected to adhere to minimum labour standards.50 
                                                                                                                                                        
intensive  employment  programmes  aimed  at  maximising  short-term  job  creation  and  labour-based 
employment  programmes,  which  give  as  least  as  much  attention  to  objective  of  asset  creation  (cf. 
Devereux,  2002b:  2).  It  nonetheless  remains  true  that  social  grants  programmes  normally  achieve 
significantly higher cash transfer-to-total expenditure ratios than public works programmes. 
50 The National Treasury undertook to release a discussion document on the envisaged wage subsidy 
scheme at the end of March 2010.   37 
The notion of a wage subsidy has been on the policy agenda in South Africa for some 
time, having been mooted in 2007 in the context of retirement provision reform as an 
intervention  to  encourage  job  creation  and  the  payment  of  living  wages  in  labour-
intensive sectors and low-wage occupations (National Treasury, 2007b: 112-113). It 
also  was  proposed  by  the  Harvard  University  team  that  assisted  the  South  African 
Government in the preparation of the Asgisa strategy (Levinsohn, 2008). The Minister 
of  Finance  indicated  that  the  goal  of  the  envisaged  scheme  would  be  to  increase 
employment of young school-leavers by 500 000 by 2013 (cf. Gordhan, 2010: 10). It is 
difficult  to  judge  the  feasibility  of  this  target.  Attempts  to  model  the  effects  of 
hypothetical wage subsidy schemes for unskilled and semi-skilled workers (e.g. Pauw 
and Edwards, 2006; Go, Kearney, Korman, Robinson and Thierfelder, 2009) indicated 
that such interventions should stimulate employment in South Africa, but the strength 
of the impact will depend on the elasticities of substitution of production factors and the 
flexibility of the labour market. This suggests that the decision to launch such a scheme 
on a limited scale by targeted a specific cohort among the unemployed was sensible. 
Of late, attention is also being given to the scope for using the existing grants to provide 
increased  access  to  economic  opportunities  to  able-bodied  household  members  of 
grants recipients. This idea was the topic of a discussion  document released by the 
Department of Social  Development (2006) and also  featured in the  draft discussion 
document  on  an  anti-poverty  strategy  for  South  Africa,  which  suggested  that  the 
administrative structures of the grants system could be a facilitating mechanism for 
anti-poverty interventions:  
The  channel  of  grants’  administration  offers  a  unique  opportunity  to 
reach  poor  working  and  unemployed  people  to  enhance  their 
participation in the economy. The objective is to identify scalable policy 
options that could be linked to the grants, insofar as they enhance the 
access  to  economic  opportunity  for  labour  market  participants  in 
beneficiary households… It will… allow for targeting interventions to have 
greater impact. (The Presidency, 2008: 50) 
In a paper commissioned by the Department of Social Development, Altman and Boyce 
(2008) identified varied policy options of this nature. Such interventions are related to 
elements of the workfare programmes that have been adopted by the United States and 
a  growing  number  of  European  countries.  Section  4.5  comments  on  the  scope  for 
implementing such programmes in South Africa. 
4.3  Conditional cash transfers  
4.3.1  Overview and international experience  
Rawlings  (2005:  134)  summarised  the  essence  of  conditional  cash  transfer  (CCT) 
programmes as follows: "Conditional cash transfers provide money to poor families on 
condition  that they make investments in  human  capital such as  sending children to 
school or bringing them to health centres on a regular basis". The first CCT programme 
was the Progresa scheme introduced in Mexico in 1971. Progresa consisted of cash and 
in-kind transfers to households whose children regularly attended school and whose 
members  all  visited  health  centres  regularly.  The  education  component  of  Progresa 
targeted poor households with children in primary and secondary school, and provided   38 
educational  grants  and  support  for  school  materials.  The  programme  also  included 
supply-side benefits: teachers, for example, received bonuses for every pupil who was 
on the programme. The health component focused on poor households with pregnant 
and  lactating  women,  children  under  two  years  of  age,  and  malnourished  children 
between  the  ages  of  two  and  five;  the  benefits  included  cash  grants  for  food 
consumption, basic health care services, nutrition and health education, and nutrition 
supplements  (Rawlings  and  Rubio,  2005:  32).  Furthermore,  Progresa  had  a  positive 
gender bias: benefits were disbursed to the female heads of participating households, 
and participating secondary-school girls received higher cash grants than boys, because 
the former face higher risks of dropping out of school and their educational attainment 
brings  positive  externalities  (Britto,  2005:  8).  In  2002,  Progresa  was  renamed 
Oportunidades and its scope was expanded to also include income generation for poor 
households by means of preferential access to microcredit, housing improvements, and 
adult education (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 32). 
Subsequently, several  other  Western Hemisphere  developing countries  also adopted 
CCT schemes, including Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica and Nicaragua. Brazil, for 
example, adopted the Bolsa Escola scheme in 2001. This programme granted monthly 
cash transfers to poor households with children aged six to fifteen enrolled in grades 
one to eight, provided that they maintained school attendance rates of 85 percent or 
higher (Britto, 2005: 10-11). Bolsa Escola benefits were also disbursed to female heads 
of households. The benefits provided by Brazil's federal government were significantly 
lower than those of Progresa, but richer states and municipalities were allowed to raise 
the transfers or expand coverage. The details of the targeting of beneficiaries were also 
left to municipalities (Britto, 2005: 11). In 2003, Bolsa Escola was unified with other 
federal CCT schemes, creating a programme known as Bolsa Família. Apart from better 
coordination with other social spending initiatives, Bolsa Família added health-related 
conditionalities  to  Bolsa  Escola's  education-related  ones  and  markedly  extended  the 
coverage and size of transfers. 
The adoption of CCT schemes was a direct response to the shortcomings of traditional 
social assistance programmes, including high administrative costs, poor targeting of the 
needy, fragmentation of projects and programmes, and an overemphasis on short-term 
relief of poverty with inadequate attention to longer-term poverty of a structural nature 
(Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 30, 33). Hence, the explicit aim of CCT schemes is to combat 
current poverty (by providing income support that enables consumption smoothing) as 
well as future poverty (by encouraging human capital accumulation among the young in 
an attempt to break the intergenerational poverty cycle) (Das, Do and Özler, 2005: 57; 
Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 33). Other notable features of Latin American CCT schemes 
have  included  strong  emphasis  on  obtaining  co-responsibility  for  the  success  of 
interventions  from  participants;  an  explicit  focus  on  achieving  complementarities 
between the education, health and nutrition elements of human capital development; 
carefully planned impact assessment (which  also were used as  bases  for expanding 
programmes); and various innovative targeting mechanisms (Rawlings, 2005: 144-148; 
Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 36-38).51 
                                                 
51 CCT programmes use a variety of targeting mechanisms (mainly a combination of geographical and 
household-level targeting, sometimes based on proxy means tests) (cf. Rawlings, 2005: 145; Rawlings and 
Rubio, 2005: 36-38). Honduras uses the Height Census of First Grade School children to provide data on 
malnutrition levels. In Mexico, qualifying communities in rural areas are selected using a marginality   39 
According to Das et al. (2005: 57), CCT programmes "… are technically feasible in that 
the main stated goals of the programs are actually met in practice and are politically 
acceptable  in  that  successive  governments  are  willing  to  continue  and  even  expand 
program  coverage".  The  political  acceptability  of  CCT  programmes  was  reflected  in 
marked increases in budgets and the number of recipients over time. When Progresa 
began in Mexico it involved 300 000 individuals; by 2002, the number of participants 
had grown to more than 4 million (20 percent of the population) (Rawlings and Rubio, 
2005:  38).  The  same  trend  was  observed  in  Brazil,  where  some  5 million  people 
participated  in  Bolsa  Escola  in  2002  (Britto,  2005:  7).  Rawlings  (2005:  149-151) 
summarised evidence on the effectiveness of CCT schemes as follows: 
  Primary  and  secondary  school  enrolment  rates  have  increased  markedly  in 
Mexico, Colombia and Nicaragua since the introduction of CCT schemes. 
  The impact of CCT programmes on school attendance has been mixed, ranging 
from very impressive in Nicaragua to modest in Mexico. 
  It appears as if the introduction of CCT programmes has significantly reduced the 
incidence of child labour in Mexico and Brazil. 
  In several countries (including Mexico, Colombia and Nicaragua), child health 
and nutrition have also improved since the adoption of CCT programmes. 
  Participation  in  CCT  programmes  apparently  has  contributed  to  higher 
consumption levels in Mexico, Colombia and Nicaragua. 
  Evaluations have suggested that CCT programmes are efficient (81 percent of the 
programme  benefits  have  accrued  to  the  poorest  40 percent  of  families)  and 
cost-effective in terms of the ratio between benefits and administrative costs. 
These findings are encouraging, but it should be kept in mind that it is still too soon to 
properly  gauge  the  longer-term  developmental  impact  of  conditional  cash  transfer 
programmes (Rawlings, 2005: 154). More generally, such interventions by no means 
are panaceas for solving the challenge of designing effective social assistance systems. 
CCT programmes can be effective for overcoming obstacles to full use of schools and 
health  clinics  by  the  poor,  including  high  pecuniary  and  opportunity  costs,  difficult 
access  and  inadequate  incentives  for  investing  in  the  human  capital  of  children 
(Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 33). Clearly, such schemes cannot address the short-term 
consumption  needs  of  poor  households  without  young  children.  Furthermore,  their 
impact  on  human  capital  accumulation  will  be  negligible  in  areas  where  school 
enrolment  and  attendance  among  poor  children  are  high  already  or  where  service 
delivery institutions are absent or incapable of providing high-quality education and 
health services (Rawlings, 2005: 156; Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 33). In such cases, the 
introduction of CCT programmes should be complemented by increased investment in 
and institutional reform of the supply of education and health care. 
                                                                                                                                                        
index based on census data. Furthermore, in Jamaica, beneficiaries’ eligibility is continuously reviewed. 
This happens every three years in Mexico as well. In Nicaragua the programme only lasts three years in a 
community and is then phased out within two years.   40 
4.3.2  Application to South Africa 
In some ways, conditional cash transfer programmes are attractive interventions in the 
current  South  African  context:  in  return  for  what  should  be  a  modest  increase  in 
administrative  costs  associated  with  monitoring  compliance,  such  schemes  promise 
significantly  higher  returns  on  current  social  grants  spending  (mainly  accelerated 
human  capital  accumulation  among  children  in  poor  households).  Moreover,  the 
adoption of CCT programmes would not require modification of a design principle that 
is deeply entrenched in South Africa, namely that social assistance should be limited to 
economically inactive vulnerable groups. 
The National Treasury (2008b: 94) first indicated an interest in adding conditions to the 
child  support  grant  in  February  2008,  when  it  announced  that  "a  review  will  be 
undertaken this year of the grant's administration and targeting mechanisms, and of 
appropriate  conditional  criteria,  such  as  school  attendance  and  immunisation  of 
qualifying  children".  The  2009  Budget  Review  (National  Treasury,  2009a:  91) 
confirmed that "… research has been undertaken on options for linking grants to key 
aspects of child care, such as schooling and health monitoring", but failed to report any 
concrete findings. Conditions for the child support grant were introduced effective from 
1 January 2010 (cf. National Treasury, 2010a: 104). This entails that the caregivers of 
beneficiaries  must  (1)  ensure  that  they  are  enrolled  and  attending  school,  and  (2) 
submit regular proof of enrolment and reports from the school to the Department of 
Social Development. In cases where these conditions are breached, the Department of 
Social Development will send a social worker to investigate and institute steps to ensure 
that  the  child  attends  school.  However,  punitive  measures  (such  as  terminating  the 
grant) are not envisaged. 
Das et al. (2005) suggested a useful conceptual framework for assessing the need for 
and likely effectiveness of conditional cash transfers in a variety of settings. Their point 
of departure was a standard theoretical argument for the superiority of unconditional 
cash  transfers  over  conditional  cash  transfers:  all  other  things  equal,  successful 
attempts to change the behaviour of rational (non-myopic) poor agents by means of 
conditional transfers reduce their welfare, because such efforts distort the decisions of 
the  agents  by  inducing  them  to  make  choices  which  they  would  not  have  made 
otherwise (Das et al., 2005: 63). They then posed the following question: could there be 
market failures which prevent poor agents from making optimal choices, in which case 
appropriately designed conditional cash transfer programmes could enhance efficiency 
and the welfare of individual agents and society as a whole? Das et al. (2005: 64-71) 
identified the  following possible  market  failures  which could  make  conditional cash 
transfer interventions welfare-enhancing: 
  Efficiency-related market failures. Mismatches between the interests of children 
and the preferences of parents could result in underinvestment in the education 
of the former. Children cannot credibly commit themselves to repaying parents 
for  investments  in  their  schooling.  Hence,  some  parents  may  prefer  inferior 
short-run  outcomes  which  benefit  them  relatively  more  (e.g.  higher  incomes 
resulting  from  child  labour  or  from  using  school-age  children  to  look  after 
younger siblings) to superior long-run outcomes involving relatively larger gains 
for  the  children.  In  such  cases,  cash  grants  tied  to  school  enrolment  and   41 
attendance  could  yield  higher  levels  of  efficiency  and  welfare  by  reducing  or 
eliminating the gap between parental preferences and children's interests. 
  Equity-related market failures. When it is not feasible to use conventional means 
testing for targeting purposes, attaching conditions to a cash transfer scheme 
programme can be a useful self-targeting alternative. The idea would be to use 
conditions which would tilt the cost-benefit calculation of higher-income groups 
against  participation  in  the  scheme  (e.g.  prescribing  periodic  visits  to  public 
health  facilities  which  require  a  degree  of  queuing  that  would  impose  high 
opportunity costs on richer people with access to other health facilities). 
Yet the existence of such market failure is not a sufficient rationale for the adoption of 
CCT  programmes.  Das  et  al.  (2005:  66-69)  note  that  conditions  may  not  have  the 
desired effects if the perception that the costs of the condition(s) outweigh the benefits 
of the grants causes potential participants to shun the programme. Another possible 
cause  of  programme  failure  is  the  fungibility  of  most  conditioned-on  commodities: 
participants could undermine CCT programmes by switching their consumption to close 
substitutes  of  the  conditioned-on  goods  (e.g.  by  decreasing  their  consumption  of 
oranges when given vitamin C tablets, or by reducing the food intake of children at 
home when they participate in school lunch programmes). Thus, careful cost-benefit 
analysis is required to estimate the potential effectiveness of CCT programmes. 
On balance, lessons from the experiences of other countries and the issues raised by Das 
et al. (2005) suggest that conditional cash transfer programmes are unlikely to be cost-
effective interventions in the current South African context. CCT programmes work on 
the demand side of social-service provision, but this is not where the real problems are 
to be found in South Africa as far as these services are concerned.52 School enrolment 
and attendance figures, for instance, are high already:  General Household Survey data 
showed that the school attendance ratio among 5 to 19 -year olds in grant-receiving 
households was 90 percent in 2007, up from 87 percent in 2003. For 5 to 19-year olds 
in  living  in  low -earning  households  receiving  child  support  grants,  the  school 
attendance ratio increased from 86  percent in 2003 to 90  percent in 2007 (Statistics 
South Africa, 2009b: 17-18). Furthermore, the success of existing targeting mechanisms 
precludes  the  need  to  use  conditions  for  screening  purposes.  Inefficiency  and 
effectiveness on the supply side of the social service provision are  major obstacles to 
human capital accumulation among poor children in South Africa 53; indeed, in some 
cases, supply-side problems are already weakening the demand for publicly provided 
social  services  for  which  private  alternatives  exist. 54  Unless  these  probl ems  are 
                                                 
52 The introduction of no-fee schools, for example, has markedly reduced the pecuniary costs of education 
to poor parents in South Africa. 
53 This issue also was highlighted by another assessment of the potential of CCT programs in the South 
African context (Lund, Noble, Barnes and Wright, 2008: 16): "... school attendance rates are good (though 
they may become less so with HIV/AIDS). Given the parlous quality of education for poor South Africans 
in both urban and rural areas, it is not necessarily getting children to school that matters in breaking long 
term poverty: it is about resources and facilities, or management, or teaching practice at schools ... It is a 
supply-side problem... Poor teaching and lack of leadership in under-resourced schools are common, and 
there are low returns to education for a number of years. Enrolment and attend ance are necessary 
conditions in trying to escape poverty, but they are not sufficient." 
54 An example of this is health care, where even lower-income groups show an overwhelming preference 
for private care, where it is available and affordable (cf. Van der Berg et al., 2009: 36).   42 
addressed, the most likely effect of the adoption of conditions is likely to be a dilution of 
the  current  poverty  impact  of  the  child  support  grant  resulting  from  higher 
administrative and compliance costs. This would be most unfortunate given the need 
for effective anti-poverty interventions and the situation of severe fiscal stress in South 
Africa right now.  
The conditions introduced for the child support grant with effect from 1 January 2010 
therefore make little sense. The constraint on human capital accumulation by means of 
the  schooling  system  is  the  supply-side  problem  of  ineffectiveness in  provision,  not 
demand-side  problems  related  to  low  enrolment  or  attendance;  furthermore,  the 
intervention lacks credible sanctions for non-compliance on the part of participants. 
One reason for the absence of sanctions could be that making eligibility for the child 
support grant conditional upon school attendance sits uneasily with the rights-based 
approach of the South African Constitution. Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996) stipulates that everyone has the right to have 
access  to  social  security, including appropriate social  assistance  for those  unable  to 
support themselves. Be that as it may, whatever human capital investment may result 
from  the  adoption  of  the  conditions  probably  will  not  outweigh  the  accompanying 
increase in the administrative and compliance costs of the child support grant scheme. 
4.4  Workfare programmes 
4.4.1  Nature and international experience 
Standing (1990: 680) defined workfare as a "government-administered policy whereby 
those in need and without regular employment are obliged to undertake work-related 
activity in return for state income transfers". A further distinction is sometimes made 
between  two  categories  of  workfare  schemes  which  impose  different  types  of 
obligations on the recipients of social grants: mandatory workfare requires actual work, 
while  "new-style"  workfare  requires  participation  in  other  employment-related 
programmes  (such  as  job-seeking,  community  work,  training  and  formal  schooling) 
(Standing, 1990: 680).55 Public works programmes (such as the EPWP) therefore are 
examples  of  mandatory  workfare  schemes.  This  section  focuses  on  "new -style" 
workfare programmes. 
Contemporary workfare programmes originated in OECD countries, where trends such 
as rising long-term unemployment and changing family structures prompted concern 
about the work incentive effects of traditional social assistance systems and their ability 
to  address  growing  social  exclusion  (Tesliuc,  2006:  5 -8).  Core  elements  of  such 
programmes have included steps to reduce the amounts and duration of benefits and to 
force beneficiaries to seek work actively, often complemented by other measures to 
encourage working and social inclusion, including termination of the cancelling of 
benefits when recipients obtain part-time work, changing the delivery of benefits from 
the household to individuals so that individuals do not jeopardise the household's 
access to benefits when they find jobs, making the provision of benefits conditional on 
finding employment (e.g. cash bonuses, wage supplements and tax credits), and offering 
more assistance to job seekers (labour-market information, training programmes,  etc) 
                                                 
55 Hence, workfare programmes are a subset of conditional cash transfer programmes, but with a specific 
focus on members of the labour force.   43 
(Tesliuc, 2006: 7).56 Hudson and Kühner (2009) described this development as a shift 
from "protective" to "productive" modes of providing social assistance.57  
The United States pioneered modern welfare reforms aimed at integrating recipients of 
social benefits into the formal labour market. The workfare approach can be traced back 
to experimental programmes introduced by the Reagan Administration in 1981, but 
reached maturity under the Clinton Administration with the implementation of the 
Personal  Responsibility  and  Wor k  Opportunity  Act  (PRWORA)  of  1996  and  other 
welfare reforms. The major elements of US workfare programmes have been as follows 
(cf. Blank, 2004: 4-8). First, PRWORA abolished the matching-grant Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) programme and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF), provided to states as a block grant. The introduction of TANF 
allowed the states much more discretion over programme design than AFDC, and the 
block-grant  basis  raised  the  importance  of  careful  design  by  transferring  the  full 
financial risk of cycles in assistance needs to states. The PRWORA legislation also made 
access  to  federal  funds  conditional  on  states  placing  larger  numbers  of  their  active 
welfare recipients in jobs, limited TANF-funded assistance to 60 months over the full 
lifetimes of individuals, and limited access to income assistance programmes by certain 
targeted groups (e.g. immigrants and certain categories of disabled persons). The states 
responded to the PRWORA legislation by: 
  markedly expanding their welfare-to-work programmes 
  reducing  the  rate  at  which  cash  benefits  decrease  as  earnings  increase  (to 
encourage working) 
  enforcing  sanctions  (benefit  losses)  on  assistance  recipients  who  did  not 
participate in work programmes 
  enforcing the Federal 60-month limit on eligibility for TANF-funded assistance 
and, in some cases, setting and implementing even tighter limits 
Other policy changes strengthened state-level efforts to get welfare recipients in jobs. 
These included the expansion of in-kind assistance to needy families by means of child-
care subsidies, food stamps and Medicaid services, as well minimum wage increases and 
expanded refundable tax credits under the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) system 
(Blank, 2004: 9-12). 
In a careful review of the empirical evidence, Blank (2004: 14-18) highlighted three 
major results of these changes: 
  The number of persons on the welfare rolls dropped by 42 percent from 1994 to 
2001, and did not rebound significantly during the 2000-2001 recession. 
  Employment  increased  sharply  during  the  late-1990s,  especially  among  less-
skilled single mothers. Data from 2002 showed that the majority of the women 
                                                 
56 Ochel (2005: 78) emphasized that workfare programmes focus primarily on work; training and other 
mechanisms to achieve reintegration into the labour market are of secondary importance. 
57 This shift also could be described in terms of the typology proposed by Devereux (2002a: 661, 662) as 
one from a "livelihood protection" to a "livelihood promotion" approach (cf. section 3.2.2).   44 
who had left welfare in the 1990s remained employed, although a significant 
minority were jobless. 
  The incomes of single mothers (the group affected most heavily by the changes) 
rose during the second half of the 1990s, despite the fact that many of them lost 
cash benefits as a result of the introduction of workfare. 
These  developments  suggest  that  workfare  programmes  have  succeeded  in  their 
primary aims of reducing welfare caseloads and moving welfare recipients into jobs. 
Blank  (2004:  37-40),  however,  added  that  it  is  particularly  difficult  to  separate  the 
effects of such programmes from concurrent labour-market developments such as the 
rapid growth in job opportunities and earnings in the US during the second half of the 
1990s; furthermore, it is too soon to ascertain some of the longer-term effects of the 
welfare reforms on the livelihoods and social choices of needy families. 
Welfare reforms with workfare elements were also implemented in the United Kingdom 
by the Labour Government of Tony Blair, as well as in the Scandinavian countries. The 
UK  reforms,  known  as  the  New  Deal,  offer  assistance  to  four  groups  of  welfare 
recipients: young unemployed persons aged 18 to 24, long-term unemployed aged 25 
and above, lone parents and disabled people (cf. Kildal, 2001: 4; Ochel, 2006: 80-81). 
Younger  unemployed  persons  first  entered  a  period  of  intensive  job-search  (the 
"Gateway"),  after  which  they  had  to  choose  among  four  six-month  options,  namely 
subsidised  employment,  full-time  education  and  training,  voluntary  service,  and  the 
Environmental Task Force (Ochel, 2006: 80). This was followed by another period of 
intensive job search (known as the "follow-through"). Unemployed persons aged 25 and 
above who had received the Jobseeker's Allowance continuously for 12 to 18 months 
underwent a 13-week Gateway period, followed by an Intensive Activity Period that 
lasted  another  13  weeks  and  provided  subsidised  employment  or  education  and 
training opportunities (Ochel, 2006: 81). Several studies reviewed by Ochel (2006: 80-
81) found that the New Deal programmes successfully promoted the employment of 
younger and long-term unemployed people in the United Kingdom. 
The Scandinavian countries have long combined a commitment to the maintenance of 
full employment (pursued by means of active labour-market policies, inter alia) with the 
belief that generous social benefits for the unemployed are basic social rights regardless 
of achievements and financial means (cf. Kildal, 2001: 5-6). During the second half of the 
1990s,  however,  the  governments  of  these  countries  also  introduced  workfare-like 
welfare  reforms,  with  Denmark  leading  the  way.  Prior  to  a  series  of  labour-market 
reforms introduced from 1993 until 1998, the jobless in Denmark could have accessed 
unemployment  benefits  indefinitely,  provided  that  they  had  participated  in  work 
programmes for six months during each three-year benefit cycle (Kildal, 2001: 7-9). The 
first wave of reforms abolished the right to earn new benefits through participating in 
work programmes by limiting the period of entitlement to seven years, of which the last 
three years involved compulsory "activation initiatives" aimed at reintegration into the 
labour  market.  The  limits  subsequently  were  tightened  and  by  1998  the  maximum 
unemployment period was four years, including three years of activation activities. In 
1996, these steps were complemented by special measures for low-skilled individuals 
under 25 years of age, who after six months of unemployment were compelled to enter 
education  or  work-training  programmes  and  accept  sharply  reduced  benefits.  Ochel 
(2006:  81)  reported  positive  employment  effects  for  these  Danish  workfare   45 
programmes, but Kildal (2001) was more circumspect and expressed concern about the 
implications  of  such  programmes  for  norms  of  fairness  and  justice  that  have  long 
underpinned the Scandinavian welfare regimes. 
The available evidence therefore indicates that workfare programmes can be effective 
mechanisms  for  returning  welfare  recipients  to  work,  especially  in  rapidly  growing 
economies  where  sufficient  numbers  of  jobs  are  created  to  absorb  programme 
participants in the regular labour market. The importance of the availability of jobs is 
magnified by the reality that workfare programmes affect the low-skilled labour market 
by assisting unemployed people in getting regular public or private sector employment. 
In contrast to public works programmes, which provide government-created temporary 
jobs,  workfare  therefore  causes  competition  between  social  security  recipients  and 
regular workers for low skilled work in the formal labour market (e.g. sweeping streets, 
cleaning parks, and basic clerical tasks). Hence, inadequate availability of jobs may well 
be the most serious barrier to the successful implementation of workfare programmes. 
Moreover,  the  US  experience  showed  that  workfare  programmes  can  be  time-
consuming and financially expensive: the costs to be taken into consideration are the 
work-related  and  child  care  expenses  of  recipients  as  well  as  supervisory  and 
administrative costs (Samson, Rosenblum, Haarmann, Haarmann, MacQuene and Van 
Niekerk, et al., 2001: 12). Kildal (2001: 14) also warned that workfare-type schemes 
could easily lead to two-tiered labour markets in which poor labourers are compelled to 
work  on  "second-rate  terms",  lacking  labour  rights  and  sickness,  vacation  and 
unemployment benefits. 
4.4.2  Application to South Africa 
The discussion document released by the Department of Social Development (2006: 7) 
acknowledged that efforts relying solely on conditions-based incentives are unlikely to 
successfully draw the poor and beneficiaries of social grants into economic activity in 
South Africa. Hence, it argued for a more holistic approach that provides for a range of 
supporting measures to enable these groups to access economic opportunities. To this 
end, the document proposed the interventions listed in table 11 to assist the various age 
cohorts. Specific attention was given to two sets of interventions: "exit strategies" for 
the  beneficiaries  of  child  support  grants  and  persons  with  disabilities  capable  of 
rehabilitation, and measures to assist the care givers of beneficiaries of child support 
grants.58  The  document  also  outlined  the  rudiments  of  a  process  model  for  such 
interventions. According to the envisaged model, one agency would be responsible for 
compiling a so-called "gateway profile" for targeted beneficiaries, assist ing them in 
exploring options, providing them with income incentives, and entering into a "social 
contract" with them. This agency also would be charged with referring beneficiaries to 
partner  institutions  providing  the  actual  economic  opportunities,  for  e xample  the 
Department of Labour, the Department of Education and civil society organisations 
(Department of Social Development, 2006: 8). 
                                                 
58 The rationales for these foci included that 36 percent of the beneficiaries of disability grant at the time 
had physical disabilities which did not preclude them from doing certain types of work, and that more 
than 85 percent of the care givers of child support grant beneficiaries were unemployed (Department of 
Social Development, 2006: 3, 5).   46 
In a report commissioned by the Department of Social Development, Altman and Boyce 
(2008: 5) fleshed out these principles by identifying five policy instruments ("direct job 
placement  and  job  creation,  top-up  subsidies  or  vouchers,  credit  for  productive 
activities,  information,  and  insurance")  and  four  general  policy  options  ("direct  job 
creation, enhancement of job search and employability, support for self-employment, 
and support to stabilise income from employment or self-employment"). Application of 
these  instruments  to  the  various  policy  options  yielded  the  following  proposals  for 
interventions (Altman and Boyce, 2008: 22-33): 
  Direct job creation. Access to EPWP opportunities could be facilitated by means 
of  dissemination  of  information,  while  vouchers  could  be  used  to  stimulate 
activity  in  the  social  sector  of  the  Programme  (e.g.  child-care  services).  In 
addition, an employment voucher could be provided to working-age youth in 
beneficiary households to finance temporary work experiences. 
  Enhanced job search and employability. Proposals included dissemination of job-
search information, provision of education and training vouchers to members of 
beneficiary households, provision of transport coupons or subsidies to members 
of  beneficiary  households  who  manage  to  find  jobs,  and  incentives  to 
temporarily disabled grants recipients to return to work. 
  Support for self-employment. Vouchers for the purchasing of advice and inputs, 
insurance against theft and access to credit could be made available to persons 
linked to grants beneficiaries. 
  Stabilising incomes. Insurance for productive assets could be offered to increase 
the viability of businesses, while women in grant-receiving households could be 
provided with HIV/Aids services to enable them to remain employed. 
  Table 11   
  Proposed interventions to facilitate access to economic opportunities   
  Age cohort  Interventions   
  < 18 years  Child support grants   
  Disabled persons  Re-assessment; training and skills development   
  Single parents  Specific assistance based on age, background and skills   
  18-22 years  Tertiary and technical education; training support   
  23-40 years  Adult basic education; training and skills development;    
  job placement in local industries   
  41-50 years  Training; job placement and self-employment support   
  51-60 years  Job placement in services industry   
  60 years >  Old-age pensions   
  Source: Adapted from Department of Social Development (2006: 11)   
     
These ideas clearly have much in common with the "new-style" workfare programmes 
of some OECD countries. Nonetheless, if such programmes were to be introduced in 
South Africa at this juncture, the purpose and systemic implications would differ in   47 
important ways from those in the OECD countries. These countries introduced workfare 
schemes  to  curtail  social  assistance  dependence  and  spending;  in  South  Africa,  the 
adoption of such programmes would represent an expansion of the social assistance 
system. The fiscal costs of such programmes would depend on their scope and design, 
but large-scale interventions would be out of the question in South Africa in the present 
fiscal climate. Being additions to the South African social assistance systems, however, 
workfare programmes would not leave any of the poor worse off, as the imposition of 
work requirements and term limits on eligibility for assistance sometimes did in the 
United States. 
Workfare-type programmes could be useful elements of anti-poverty policy in South 
Africa, but their potential impact should not be  exaggerated.  The  very  high  level  of 
unemployment and relatively low level of informal-sector participation highlighted in 
section 4.2 are indicative of a badly malfunctioning labour market. Workfare schemes 
and other job-creation initiatives could mitigate the symptoms of such malfunctioning, 
but lasting progress would require rectification of the causes of high unemployment in 
South Africa. These are likely to be found in the education system and in labour-market 
policy and practice. In the absence of job creation, the impact of workfare programmes 
could be restricted severely by the paucity of jobs available to participants. 
While  it  makes  no  sense  to  adopt  additional  layers  of  policy  measures  to  rectify 
distortions caused by existing interventions, workfare and other employment-creation 
initiatives can help to overcome market failures. Levinsohn's (2008: 9-11) proposal of a 
wage subsidy targeted at recent school leavers, for example, rested on the argument 
that market imperfections may well prejudice the employment prospects of younger 
work seekers in South Africa. Similar arguments could be made in support of some of 
the  proposals  of  Altman  and  Boyce  (2008),  including  dissemination  of  information 
about job opportunities, initiatives to improve access to credit among the poor, and 
provision  of transport coupons  or subsidies. In  using market failures  as  criteria  for 
judging the economic merits of workfare programmes, it should be kept in mind though 
that the prevalence of market failure is at best a necessary condition for government 
intervention: in practice, government intervention often gives rise to larger distortions 
than those caused by the market failures they were intended to address. The risk of 
government failure in the implementation of workfare programmes would be relatively 
high: the process model envisaged by the Department of Social Development (2006) 
would require coordinated decision-making by various institutions which also would 
have to deal with uncertainties regarding labour-market conditions and the ability and 
motivation of programme participants.59 Moreover, Altman and Boyce (2008: 24) made 
a  very  important  point  when  they  stated  that  "…  simplicity  in  the  aims  and 
implementation  has  been  an  important  strength  of  the  social  grants  programme. 
Imposing requirements that may be difficult to monitor or even achieve could make the 
programme less successful". 
                                                 
59 The experience with the National Skills Development Strategy has underlined this danger. This Strategy 
has  a  clear  and  sound  economic  rationale,  has  had  strong  political  support  and  has  received  ample 
funding. Yet according to the National Treasury (2010a: 50), implementation problems have  severely 
blunted its impact: "… the system suffers from weak reporting requirements, underdeveloped capacity, 
lack of effective management, and inadequate monitoring and evaluation, limiting the ability of SETAs to 
serve as primary vehicles for skills development".   48 
International  experience  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  political  economy 
considerations in the design of workfare programmes. It is sometimes argued that work 
requirements  make  the  extension  of  social  assistance  to  employable  persons  more 
acceptable politically (cf. Standing, 1990: 688). This claim, however, ignores the reality 
that workfare programmes often raise the ire of labour unions concerned about the 
possible development of a parallel labour market which might threaten worker rights 
and undermine the bargaining position of lower-skilled, lower-paid workers throughout 
the economy. Such opposition to workfare schemes from organised labour has come to 
the fore in the context of public works programmes in developing countries such as 
Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  (Seekings,  2006:  18-19).  Moreover,  left-wing  critics  of 
welfare reform in the United States have argued that workfare programmes exacerbate 
the downward pressure on the wages, job security and working conditions of ordinary 
workers caused by globalisation and firm-friendly economic policies (Midgley, 2008: 
38-39). The Government obtained support for the Expanded Public Works Programme 
from  organised  labour  by  negotiating  a  Code  of  Practice  for  Special  Public  Works 
Programmes which governs wage-setting and other aspects of employment (Seekings, 
2006:19),  and  something  similar  may  be  required  depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
economic opportunities provided as part of workfare programmes. 
5  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The South African social assistance system is an effective intervention which markedly 
reduces poverty and apparently does not have severe undesirable behavioural effects. 
The scope for strengthening anti-poverty policy in South Africa by further expanding 
the social grants system nonetheless has become very limited: attempts to do so could 
easily overburden the fiscus and encourage various types of undesirable behaviour. It 
would be particularly risky to introduce unemployment or universal income grants with 
a view to addressing the major lacuna in the social assistance system, namely the lack of 
support  for  unemployed  members  of  the  labour  force  without  access  to  the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Expanded Public Works Programme. The fact of 
the matter is that sustainable poverty reduction in South Africa requires inclusive job-
creating economic growth, and this should remain the primary focus of anti-poverty 
policy. 
Several other policy implications follow from the contents of this paper. 
Short- to medium-term policy implications: 
  Social-assistance outlays should be protected as far as possible during the next few 
years.  Fiscal  consolidation,  including  strict  public  spending  discipline,  is  now 
unavoidable in South Africa. The poverty-reducing effects of the social grants as 
well as their safety-net function (the importance of which was evident during the 
global  economic  crisis)  strongly  suggest  that  the  scope  and  coverage  of  the 
grants system should not be diminished as part of the deficit-reduction process.  
  Two options which could be  considered if it does become necessary to  restrain 
social assistance spending as part of the fiscal consolidation effort are, first, to 
temporarily reduce the real value of the grants (by keeping the annual increases in 
the grant amounts values below the inflation rate) and, second, to postpone the 
announced  expansion  of  the  child  support  grant  to  children  up  to  the  age  of   49 
eighteen.  These  measures  would  reduce  the  pressure  on  social  assistance 
spending while the budget deficit is being reduced without compromising the 
scope of the grants system. 
Longer-term policy implications: 
  Social  assistance  reform  should  not  compromise  the  relative  simplicity  of  the 
grants system. The relative simplicity of the social assistance system has been 
one of the cornerstones of its success, and care should be taken in designing 
future  reforms  not  to  compromise  this  characteristic  by  introducing  complex 
institutional structures and conditions that are difficult to monitor or to achieve. 
  The  adoption  of  additional  conditional  cash  transfer  programmes  targeted  at 
needy  children  should  be  avoided.  Such  programmes  make  little  sense  in  the 
present South  African  context:  school  attendance  already  is  high  and  making 
eligibility for the  child support  grant  conditional upon school attendance  sits 
uneasily with the rights-based approach of the South African Constitution. 
  Consideration should be given to adopting targeted workfare programmes aimed 
at  expanding  the  range  of  economic  opportunities  available  to  the  poor.  Such 
programmes,  however,  could  be  costly  and  pose  formidable  design  and 
implementation challenges. Moreover, their effectiveness is likely to be limited 
by the relatively slow pace of job creation in South Africa.   
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